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This  paper  intends  to  examine  the  nature  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  of  the  future  
through  a  careful  textual  reading  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  a  work  that  was  written  in  his  
mature  period.  The  question  is  situated  in  the  context  of  three  competing  
understandings  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy,  the  postmodernist  understanding,  the  
traditionalist  understanding  and  the  political  understanding,  and  focuses  on  how  
Nietzsche  is  able  to  overcome  the  nihilistic  tendencies  inherent  in  his  doctrine  of  the  will  
to  power,  which  is  a  substitute  for  metaphysics.  The  conclusion  is  that  Nietzsche’s  vision  
of  a  philosophy  of  the  future  is  not  a  system  of  doctrines,  but  is  embodied  in  the  life  and  
soul  of  the  philosopher  of  the  future.  Thus  a  philosophy  of  the  future  in  Nietzschean  
sense  would  essentially  be  a  contemplation  of  the  highest  or  noblest  type  of  soul,  which  
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1. Introdution  
Is  Nietzsche  a  philosopher?  This  question,  which  might  have  caused  
considerable  altercations  in  the  past,  now  requires  almost  no  further  defense.1  Elevated  
to  the  status  of  a  stellar  thinker  of  the  modern  times,  Nietzsche  enjoys  much  the  same  
respect  (if  not  admiration)  and  receives  equally  serious  treatment  as  the  other  
philosophers  that  have  entered  the  Pantheon  of  the  Western  tradition  of  philosophy.    
But  the  indisputable  nature  of  Nietzsche’s  status  as  a  philosopher  does  not  necessarily  
resolved  a  related  problem:  the  nature  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy.  This  problem  is  
particularly  important  because  Nietzsche  is  a  self-­‐‑conscious,  openly  acknowledged  
antagonist  and  vehement  opponent  of  the  Western  philosophical  tradition.  While  we  can  
assume  with  a  degree  of  certainty  that  other  philosophers  before  Nietzsche  are  
addressing  a  basically  stable  set  of  philosophical  questions  using  similar  or  at  least  
related  modes  of  thinking  and  concepts,  these  assumptions  must  be  used  with  great  
caution  in  the  case  of  Nietzsche.  Indeed,  the  radical  and  unconventional  nature  of  
Nietzsche’s  philosophy  reaches  its  peak  when  one  considers  his  consistent  and  
enthusiastic  attack  on  the  notion  of  truth  throughout  his  writings2,  which  is  perhaps  the  
                                                                                                              
1  In  his  book  Nietzsche,  Psychology  and  First  Philosophy,  Robert  Pippin  tries  to  show  that  Nietzsche  
makes  great  attempts  to  replace  metaphysics  with  what  he  calls  psychology,  thus  in  this  way  
terminate  “philosophy.”  I  think  this  entails  an  unnecessarily  narrow  understanding  of  the  
concept  of  “philosophy.”  
2  It  is  disputable  whether  Nietzsche  changes  his  attitude  towards  the  concept  of  “truth”  
throughout  his  career.  A  famous  and  insightful  treatment  of  this  problem  is  Maudemarie  Clark’s  
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single  most  important  presupposition  of  Western  philosophy.  Thus,  it  is  imperative  that  
one  has  a  firm  grasp  on  the  problem  that  what  philosophy  is  for  Nietzsche  in  order  to  
understand  the  meanings  of  specific  doctrines  of  his  philosophy  such  as  eternal  
recurrence  and  will  to  power.  But  on  the  other  hand,  this  is  also  such  a  fundamental  
question  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  it  if  one  is  not  
adequately  familiar  with  the  whole  corpus  of  Nietzsche’s  works.  So  this  should  be  the  
question  as  the  starting  point  of  one’s  encounter  with  Nietzsche,  as  well  as  the  mark  of  
the  culmination  of  one’s  understanding  of  Nietzsche.  As  a  novice  student  of  Nietzsche,  I  
intend  to  use  this  paper  to  propose  a  preliminary  answer  to  this  fundamental  question  
that  may  serve  as  a  cornerstone  for  my  future  study,  and  hopefully  adds  to  the  current  
understandings  of  this  problem.  Now  I  will  briefly  introduce  these  current  opinions  and  
then  explain  why  I  choose  Beyond  Good  and  Evil  as  the  main  text  to  help  me  answer  the  
question.        
1.1 Current understandings 
Because  of  the  fundamental  nature  of  this  problem,  almost  every  interpretation  
that  aims  to  give  a  comparatively  comprehensive  understanding  of  Nietzsche’s  
                                                                                                              
  
book  Nietzsche  on  Truth  and  Philosophy,  where  she  argues  that  Nietzsche’s  attitude  towards  
“truth”  has  changed  from  the  initial  rejection  to  acceptance  in  the  later  part  of  his  career.  But  I  
think  Nietzsche’s  attitude  on  truth  remains  largely  skeptical  and  dismissive  in  his  mature  period.  
I  will  elaborate  on  this  point  in  the  following  parts  of  this  paper.  
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philosophy  would  necessarily  touch  upon  it.  Although  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  include  
most  of  the  vast  secondary  literature  on  Nietzsche,  I  have  summarized  from  my  limited  
experience  three  schools  of  different  understandings.3  Specific  interpretations  within  
each  school  may  differ  in  details,  sometimes  quite  significantly,  but  I  think  my  
categorization  is  sufficient  to  situate  my  answer  in  an  intellectual  context.  
Perhaps  the  most  popular  understanding  of  the  nature  of  Nietzschean  
philosophy  is  the  post-­‐‑modern  understanding.    Nietzsche  is  sometimes  celebrated  as  the  
first  post-­‐‑modern  philosopher  because  of  his  radical  attack  of  modernity  and  the  
Enlightenment  project.  This  line  of  interpretation  tends  to  emphasize  Nietzsche’s  
rejection  of  the  existence  of  truth  or  possibility  of  knowing  it,  and  put  great  importance  
on  his  perspectivism.  Thus,  post-­‐‑modernist  thinkers  tend  to  give  greater  attention  to  
Nietzsche’s  methods  and  style  of  writing  than  his  substantive  claims.  For  example,  
Michel  Foucault’s  “Nietzsche,  Genealogy,  History”  examines  brilliantly  the  nature  of  
Nietzsche’s  method  of  genealogy  and  how  this  method  itself  reveals  crucial  insight  into  
Nietzsche’s  vision  of  history.  The  traditional  way  of  historical  narration  presupposes  an  
“objective”  observer  who  stands  outside  “time,”  while  genealogy  thoroughly  rejects  this  
vision  to  construct  a  kind  of  history  that  is  “gray,  meticulous,  and  patiently  
                                                                                                              
3  Unfortunately,  I  have  to  exclude  Heidegger’s  interpretation  of  Nietzsche  from  my  
consideration,  because  his  interpretation  seems  to  me  to  pose  no  less  difficulty  than  the  works  of  
Nietzsche.  Because  of  the  limit  in  time  and  energy,  I  am  unable  to  study  Heidegger  enough  to  
talk  intelligently  about  him,  and  am  unwilling  to  rely  on  secondary  summaries  of  his  ideas.  This  
choice  is  made  with  the  utmost  respect  for  Heidegger’s  thought  and  the  greatest  regret.    
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documentary.”4  The  origin  or  beginning  of  something  is  no  longer  something  fixed  and  
knowable,  but  rather  fluid  and  uncertain.  Another  example  of  the  postmodern  
understanding  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  Alexander  Nehamas’s  book  Nietzsche:  Life  as  
Literature,  which  endeavors  to  apply  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  to  his  own  writing,  or  to  
use  the  style  of  his  writing  to  understand  his  philosophy.5  He  says  that  “Nietzsche’s  
positive  thinking  consists  not  so  much  in  the  specific  ideas  with  which  the  individual  
chapters  that  follow  are  concerned  (though  it  does  certainly  include  such  views)  as,  even  
more  important,  in  the  presentation,  or  exemplification,  of  a  specific  character,  
recognizably  literary,  who  makes  of  these  philosophical  ideas  a  way  of  life  that  is  
uniquely  his.”6  This  method  I  think  is  more  clearly  reflected  in  his  reading  of  BGE,  “Who  
is  the  Philosopher  of  the  Future?  A  Reading  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  in  which  he  
reaches  the  conclusion  that  Nietzsche  writes  in  aphoristic  and  disruptive  manner  in  
order  to  communicate  effectively  his  perspectivism.  His  substantive  arguments  therefore  
are  of  secondary  importance.7    
The  second  school,  which  I  would  call  the  traditionalist  school,  compared  with  
the  postmodernist  understanding,  plays  down  to  a  reasonable  extent  Nietzsche’s  break  
                                                                                                              
4  Michel  Foucault,  “Nietzsche,  Genealogy,  History,”  pp.  76  
5  Nehamas  thus  thinks  that  Nietzsche  adopts  a  kind  of  aestheticism,  “the  reliance  upon  artistic  
models  to  understand  the  world.”  See  Mark  Tomlinson,  “Nehamas’  Nietzsche,”  Interpreting  
Nietzsche,  pp.  199  
6  Alexander  Nehamas,  Nietzsche,  Life  as  Literature,  Harvard  University  Press,  1985,  pp.  18  
7  Alexander  Nehamas,  “Who  is  the  Philosopher  of  the  Future?  A  Reading  of  Beyond  Good  and  
Evil”,  in  Reading  Nietzsche,  pp.  51  
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with  the  tradition  and  underscores  more  the  affinity  or  continuity  between  Nietzsche’s  
philosophical  undertakings  and  his  predecessors.  In  particular,  these  scholars  question  
the  Post-­‐‑modernists  ready  acceptance  of  Nietzsche’s  rejection  of  truth  and  often  argue  in  
different  ways  how  Nietzsche  in  fact  still  holds  some  notions  of  the  truth  or  in  the  
possibility  of  knowing  the  truth.  Notable  examples  include  Maudemarie  Clark’s  two  
books,  Nietzsche  on  Truth  and  Philosophy  and  The  Soul  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil.  In  both  
books  she  (in  the  latter  book  with  the  co-­‐‑author  Dudrick)  attempts  to  advance  a  neo-­‐‑
Kantian  understanding  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy,  in  which  Nietzsche  continues  Kant’s  
repudiation  of  the  dogmatic  metaphysics  and  develops  a  notion  of  truth  that  is  similar  to  
Kant’s  idea  of  “assigning  truth  to  nature”  but  is  more  “naturalized.”8  This  
understanding  entails  a  more  thorough  and  serious  treatment  of  the  specific  arguments  
Nietzsche  makes  and  taking  them  to  be  serious  philosophical  arguments.9  Similar  
approach  belongs  also  to  Kaufmann’s  rendering  of  Nietzsche,  where  he  compares  
frequently  Nietzsche  with  other  philosophers.  For  example,  Kaufmann  compares  
Nietzsche’s  doctrine  of  will  to  power  and  self-­‐‑overcoming  with  Hegel’s  phenomenology  
of  the  spirit  and  argues  that  Nietzsche’s  cosmology  is  similar  to  a  kind  of  “dialectical  
monist.”10  
                                                                                                              
8  Maudemarie  Clark,  Nietzsche  on  Truth  and  Philosophy,  pp.  121  
9  Maudemarie  Clark  and  David  Dubrick,  The  Soul  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  248  
10  Walter  Kaufmann,  Nietzsche:  Philosopher,  Psychologist,  Antichrist,  pp.  235  
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The  third  school  I  think  is  characterized  by  a  “political”  understanding  of  
Nietzsche’s  philosophy.  Unlike  the  postmodernist  understanding  that  denies  Nietzsche  
has  a  single,  unified  vision  of  the  world  and  the  traditionalist  school  which  focuses  
mainly  on  Nietzsche’s  positions  on  epistemology  and  metaphysical  questions,  authors  in  
this  school  rely  heavily  on  the  moral  and  political  aspects  on  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  and  
hold  these  aspects  to  be  the  essence  of  it.  A  case  in  point  is  Tracy  Strong’s  book  Nietzsche  
and  the  Politics  of  Transfiguration,  in  which  he  argues  that  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  
fundamentally  an  effort  to  recover  the  kind  of  unity  between  philosophy  and  politics  
that  was  characteristic  of  pre-­‐‑Socratic  Greek  society  and  was  lost  with  the  unfolding  of  
the  Socratic  philosophy.11  According  to  him,  Nietzsche  sympathizes  with  Socrates’  
intention  to  “recover  a  foundation  for  morality”  in  an  age  of  social  disintegration,  but  he  
thinks  the  approach  Socrates  adopts,  namely  the  dialectical  questioning  of  moralities,  is  
not  only  ineffective  but  actually  disastrous.12  Peter  Berkowitz’s  book  Nietzsche:  The  Ethics  
of  an  Immoralist,  also  exemplifies  a  moral  or  ethical  understanding  of  Nietzsche.  
Laurence  Lampert  is  another  figure  notable  for  his  political  and  moral  understanding  of  
Nietzsche’s  philosophy.  Under  the  influence  of  Leo  Strauss,  Lampert  finds  a  kind  of  
Platonic  concern  for  the  Good  in  Nietzsche’s  two  books  of  his  mature  period,  Thus  Spoke  
Zarathustra  and  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  and  a  hidden  affinity  between  the  thought  of  Leo  
                                                                                                              
11  Tracy  Strong,  Nietzsche  and  the  Politics  of  Transfiguration,  pp.  202  
12  Ibid,  pp.  117-­‐‑22  
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Strauss  and  Nietzsche.  But  despite  their  many  similarities,  Lampert  also  points  to  the  
fundamental  conflict  or  disagreement  between  Nietzsche  and  Strauss,  in  that  the  former  
actively  rejects  the  practice  of  Platonic  noble  lies  that  protect  the  political  society  and  the  
opinions  on  which  it  is  based  from  the  radicalness  of  philosophical  activity,  while  the  
latter  insists  that  such  practice  should  not  be  abandoned.13    
All  three  schools  of  interpretation  reveal  important  aspects  of  the  nature  of  
Nietzsche’s  philosophy  by  emphasizing  different  elements  of  it.  In  this  paper,  I  will  
adopt  the  third  approach.  In  other  words,  I  also  think  that  the  Nietzschean  philosophy  
can  be  best  understood  as  a  unique  type  of  moral  or  political  philosophy.  Unlike  
traditional  type  of  moral  or  political  philosophy,  Nietzsche  does  not  devise  a  unified,  
coherent,  (hence  perhaps  dogmatic)  theory  of  the  Good.  But  he  is  also  far  from  the  
contemporary  political  philosophers,  particularly  liberal  thinkers  like  John  Rawls,  who  
refrain  completely  from  the  discussion  about  problems  of  the  Good.  I  intend  to  show,  
through  a  careful  reading  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil  with  reference  to  other  works  written  
in  his  mature  period  (Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra,  Genealogy  of  Morals,  Twilight  of  Idols,  
Antichrist,  Ecce  Homo)14,  that  Nietzsche  envisions  a  “philosophy  of  the  future”  that  
continues  the  great  tradition  of  Western  philosophy,  but  also  manages  to  resist  the  
                                                                                                              
13  Laurence  Lampert,  Leo  Strauss  and  Nietzsche,  pp.  169  
14  Southwell  thinks  that  “The  Will  to  Power  begins  with  BGE  and  contains  all  Nietzsche’s  
publications  from  there  on,  up  to  and  including  the  Antichrist.”    Gareth  Southwell,  A  Beginner’s  
Guide  to  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  14  
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temptation  to  relapse  into  the  dogmatism  characteristic  of  previous  philosophies.  When  
advancing  my  own  thesis,  I  will  make  specific  critique  or  objections  to  interpretations  
furnished  by  the  other  schools.  
1.2 Methodology: Why Beyond Good and Evil? 
Since  my  goal  is  to  provide  my  answer  to  the  question,  what  philosophy  is  for  
Nietzsche,  it  is  necessary  for  me  to  make  the  case  why  I  chose  to  focus  on  Beyond  Good  
and  Evil  instead  of  Nietzsche’s  other  works.  The  reasons  are  as  follows.  
First,  the  nature  and  theme  of  BGE  is  such  that  it  can  be  regarded  as  a  relatively  
complete  statement  of  Nietzsche’s  mature  philosophy15.  It  is  generally  accepted  that  
Nietzsche’s  works  and  thought  can  be  divided  into  three  periods16:  the  early  period  of  
Birth  of  Tragedy  (1872)  and  Untimely  Meditations  (1873-­‐‑75);  the  middle  period  of  Human,  
All  Too  Human  (1878-­‐‑80),  The  Gay  Science  (1882)  and  Daybreak  (1881);  and  the  later  period  
of  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra  (1884),  Beyond  Good  and  Evil  (1886),  and  several  other  published  
works.17Although  there  has  been  much  debate  about  the  unity  and  changes  of  these  
                                                                                                              
15  As  Acamora  and  Ansell-­‐‑Pearson  point  out,  BGE  “takes  up  virtually  every  theme  he  treats  in  
later  writings  and  presents  them  in  unified  writings.”  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil:  A  Reader’s  
Guide,  pp.  6  
16  See,  for  example,  Eric  Voegelin,  “Nietzsche  and  Pascal,”  in  The  New  Order  and  Last  Orientation,  
History  of  Political  Idea,  Vol.  VII,  The  Collected  Works  of  Eric  Voegelin,  Vol.  25,  Juergen  Gebhardt  ed.,  
University  of  Missouri  Press,  pp.  251  
17  For  a  brief  chronology  of  Nietzsche’s  life  and  works,  see  Keith  Ansell-­‐‑Pearson,  An  Introduction  
to  Nietzsche  as  Political  Thinker,  pp.  xiv-­‐‑xix  
  16  
three  periods18,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  works  of  his  third  period  represents  the  
mature  expression  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy.  Indeed,  in  a  letter  Nietzsche  wrote  to  his  
friend  Jacob  Burckhardt,  he  says  that  BGE  “says  the  same  things  as  my  Zarathustra,  but  
differently,  very  differently.”19  In  EH,  Nietzsche  says  that  Z  belongs  to  the  Yes-­‐‑saying  
part,  and  from  BGE  on,  he  starts  his  No-­‐‑saying  part  of  his  works  and  initiates  a  
campaign  to  “reevaluate  all  the  values  so  far.”  (EH)  BGE  is  thus  a  mature  and  developed  
expression  of  how  Nietzsche  envisions  his  task  and  how  he  should  carry  it  out.  Its  
subtitle,  “Prelude  to  A  Philosophy  of  the  Future,”  also  indicates  that  philosophy  is  a  
central  concern  of  this  book.20  Compared  with  Z,  which  is  full  of  allegories,  metaphors  
and  symbols,  and  with  the  three  books  of  his  middle  period,  which  are  more  aphoristic  
and  less  organized,  BGE  is  much  less  difficult  to  grasp.  And  I  think  it  is  perhaps  easier  to  
understand  Nietzsche’s  view  on  philosophy  given  what  he  rejects  in  traditional  
philosophy,  which  is  more  thoroughly  addressed  in  BGE.    
Second,  this  choice  is  also  influenced  by  Leo  Strauss,  who  wrote  his  only  essay  
that  is  devoted  entirely  to  Nietzsche  on  BGE  and  made  it  the  central  piece  of  his  
anthology  Studies  in  Platonic  Political  Philosophy.  He  also  gave  a  series  of  lectures  on  this  
                                                                                                              
18  For  example,  Paul  Franco  argues  in  his  Nietzsche’s  Enlightenment:  The  Free-­‐‑Spirit  Trilogy  of  the  
Middle  Period  that  contrary  to  the  common  view,  the  third  period  actually  bears  much  affinity  to  
the  middle  period  and  there  is  more  continuity  than  disruption  between  the  two  periods.  See,  pp.  
162  
19  Michael  Tanner,  “Nietzsche,  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  in  Philosophers  ancient  and  modern,  pp.  201  
20  “Philosophy  is  surely  the  primary  theme  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil.”  Leo  Strauss,  “Note  on  the  
Plan  of  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  Studies  in  Platonic  Philosophy,  pp.  176  
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book  at  St.  Johns  College  the  year  before  he  died.21  His  meticulous  reading  of  BGE  
provides  illuminating  insight  into  the  nature  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy,  but  it  is  itself  
written  in  a  manner  that  requires  careful  reading  and  thinking.  With  the  help  of  this  
interpretation  and  comparing  it  with  other  interpretations,  one  might  gain  a  deeper  and  
more  complete  understanding  of  the  book  as  a  whole.  
Third,  although  I  think  BGE  forms  a  unified  whole  that  best  expresses  
Nietzsche’s  understanding  of  philosophy,  I  find  a  satisfactory  articulation  of  that  vision  
is  lacking  in  current  literature.  Not  many  books  or  essays  address  specifically  BGE22,  and  
most  books  take  the  form  of  commentary  that  is  useful  in  understanding  specific  
meanings  of  individual  aphorisms,  but  still  lacking  in  a  coherent  account  of  the  book’s  
argument.23  Indeed,  Nehamas  thinks  that  for  BGE  there  is  the  serious  structural  problem  
that  “we  simply  do  not  understand  its  structure,  its  narrative  line.  Indeed,  we  do  not  
even  know  whether  it  has  any  narrative  line  at  all.”24  This  paper  intends  to  contribute  to  
such  a  kind  of  reading.  In  light  of  this  intention,  I  plan  to  proceed  following  the  order  of  
                                                                                                              
21  A  partial  list  of  recordings  of  these  lectures  can  be  found  on  the  website  of  the  Leo  Strauss  
Center  at  the  University  of  Chicago.  
22  For  a  list  of  books  and  articles  on  BGE,  see  Christa  Acampora  and  Keith  Ansell-­‐‑Pearson,  
Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil:  A  Reader’s  Guide,  pp.    
23  Berkowitz  notices  that  only  Strauss  and  Nehamas  have  written  essays  regarding  the  whole  of  
BGE.  See,  Paul  Berkowitz,  Nietzsche:  The  Ethics  of  an  Immoralist,  pp.  230  
24  Nehamas,  “Who  is  the  Philosopher  of  the  future?”  Reading  Nietzsche,  pp.  46  
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Nietzsche’s  presentation  of  his  thought  and  hope  to  uncover  the  “lucid  and  necessary  
order”25  of  the  seemingly  disconnected  aphorisms.  
1.3 Thesis 
So,  what  is  my  final  answer  to  the  question  I  propose  in  the  title  of  the  paper?  
What  is  Nietzsche’s  vision  of  “a  philosophy  of  the  future”  like?  I  have  already  said  that  I  
fundamentally  agree  with  Tracy  Strong,  Laurence  Lampert,  Peter  Berkowitz  (perhaps  
also  Leo  Strauss)  that  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  best  understood  as  a  unique  type  of  
political  or  moral  philosophy.  But  I  would  frame  the  difference  between  this  philosophy  
and  Nietzsche’s  from  a  novel  perspective.  The  first  three  chapters  of  BGE  are  an  attempt  
to  explain  a  grave  error  that  has  characterized  Western  thought  since  Plato,  which  is  the  
belief  in  the  opposite  origins  of  values.  (BGE,  2)  Previous  political  or  moral  philosophers  
presuppose  the  existence  of  truth/eternal  unchanging  order/the  Good/God  as  such,  and  
make  them  the  opposite  of  everything  human  and  in  this  world.  So  long  as  the  belief  in  
the  former  still  holds  and  is  genuine,  human  beings  are  able  to  maintain  order  within  
themsevlves  and  in  the  community,  and  thus  can  survive  and  thrive  even  in  the  face  of  
endless  suffering.  But  the  disastrous  consequences  of  this  type  of  moral  or  political  
philosophy  are  only  manifest  when  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  conceptual  distinctions  
such  as  truth/eternal  unchanging  order/God  starts  to  crumble.  God  is  dead,  but  the  
                                                                                                              
25  Leo  Strauss,  “Note  on  the  Plan  of  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  Studies  in  Platonic  
Philosophy,  pp.  177  
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nihilistic  values  continue  to  dominate  people’s  moral  imagination  in  the  so-­‐‑called  
“modern  ideas,”  now  without  the  restraining,  order-­‐‑giving  power  of  the  faith  in  God.  
This  gives  rise  to  ideological  trends  like  positivism,  liberalism,  socialism  and  feminism,  
which  for  Nietzsche  are  all  manifestations  of  the  anarchist  tendency  of  the  nihilistic  
values.    
This  is  Nietzsche’s  diagnosis  of  the  moral  and  political  situation  of  his  time,  a  
result  of  the  development  of  a  particular  type  of  philosophy.  Nietzsche  calls  it  “a  
dogmatist’s  error  –  namely,  Plato’s  invention  of  the  pure  spirit  and  the  good  as  such.”  
(BGE,  Preface)  But  Nietzsche  is  certainly  not  a  conservative  in  the  usual  sense.  He  
regards  the  demise  of  Platonism  both  as  an  unprecedented  crisis  and  an  opportunity  for  
the  rejuvenation  of  philosophy  after  two  millennia,  namely  the  unique  opportunity  to  
correct  the  error  committed  two  thousand  years  ago.  Nietzsche  frequently  refers  to  
himself  and  his  potential  allies  as  “we  good  Europeans  and  free,  very  free  spirits,”  (BGE,  
Preface),  who  are  the  predecessors  of  the  philosophers  of  the  future.  Their  task,  which  
Nietzsche  calls  “wakefulness  itself,”  is  first  to  ward  off  any  resurgence  of  Platonic  or  
dogmatic  philosophy  (which  entails  a  critique  of  modernity),  and  then  to  envision  and  
prepare  for  a  kind  of  philosophy  freed  from  “the  prejudices  of  the  philosophers.”26  
                                                                                                              
26  Leo  Strauss,  “Note  on  the  Plan  of  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  Studies  in  Platonic  
Philosophy,  pp.  175  
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Instead  Nietzsche  proposes  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power  and  makes  it  the  sole  
origin  of  both  good  and  evil  in  this  world.  Thus  for  Nietzsche,  opposite  values  actually  
have  the  same  origin  and  they  cannot  exist  alone.  So  any  moral  or  value  judgment  
should  not  be  a  sharp  dichotomy  between  good  and  evil,  but  must  be  a  spectrum  of  
different  shades  of  color.  In  other  words,  it  will  consist  of  “perspectives,”  not  on  an  
equal  plane  but  in  an  order  of  rank  from  low  to  high.  Philosophizing  thus  is  like  a  
contest  for  those  courageous  mountain-­‐‑climbers:  only  those  with  the  greatest  strength,  
health,  perseverance  and  solitude  can  reach  the  peak  or  the  near  peak,  attaining  a  more  
holistic  vision  of  the  whole  world  and  human  life  than  seen  from  the  lower  rungs  of  the  
ladder.  Seeing  from  the  height  down  on  the  human  life,  instead  of  looking  upward  from  
the  human  life  to  the  other  world,  the  philosopher  would  eventually  be  cured  of  his  
rancor  against  the  human  life  and  continue  his  philosophizing  with  genuine  laughter.  
This  philosophy  is  political  or  moral  in  the  sense  that  it  is  thoroughly  faithful  to  and  
based  on  the  human  life,  yet  it  is  also  able  to  provide  a  perspective  that  is  beyond  it,  
because  it  is  the  most  holistic  or  highest  view.  Thus  it  provides  a  genuine  basis  for  the  
genuine  peaceful  yet  dynamic  coexistence  of  the  competing  drives  in  the  soul/in  a  state.  
The  central  problem  in  understanding  the  nature  of  Nietzsche’s  philosophy,  
perhaps  also  the  central  difficulty,  is  to  understand  his  double  rejection  of  both  the  
traditional  metaphysical  philosophy/religion  and  the  modern  positivist/nihilist  
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thinking.27  What  further  confounds  the  problem  is  the  fact  that  Nietzsche  actually  
derives  much  nourishment  from  both  schools.  That  is  the  reason  why  the  other  two  
interpretative  schools  I  have  mentioned  above  seem  to  hold  that  Nietzsche  in  fact  is  not  
very  different  from  either  of  them.  I  would  instead  propose  the  following  interpretation:  
Nietzsche’s  notion  of  truth  is  fundamentally  different  from  all  previous  philosophies  
and  religions  because  his  truth  is  not  any  system  of  doctrines  about  what  is  good,  but  
lies  in  the  nature  of  the  philosopher  himself.  The  philosopher  is  the  truth.  So  the  
question  “what  is  philosophy”  is  equivalent  to  “who  is  the  philosopher”  for  Nietzsche.  
The  world  viewed  from  inside  is  “the  will  to  power,”  and  philosophy  is  the  most  
spiritual  will  to  power.  It  is  in  the  philosopher’s  will  to  power  that  the  world  that  
concerns  us  takes  shape,  since  he  creates  values  and  gives  orders.  Thus  philosophy  is  
fundamentally  political  philosophy  because  philosopher  is  the  secret  commander  and  
legislator  of  the  world,  and  the  task  of  philosophy  is  none  other  than  to  command  and  
legislate.  The  philosopher  as  the  truth  cannot  be  reduced  to  or  limited  by  any  written  
words  and  doctrines  or  systems  of  values,  although  he  must  give  orders  and  forms  in  
such  words  and  doctrines.  The  philosopher  as  the  truth  is  the  embodiment  of  both  
                                                                                                              
27  In  the  Preface  of  BGE,  Nietzsche  mentions  the  Jesuits  and  the  democratic  movement  as  two  
solutions  to  the  current  spiritual  crisis  in  Europe.  I  think  the  Jesuits  represent  the  conservative  
effort,  while  the  democratic  movement  belongs  to  the  latter,  more  modern  effort.  At  the  end  of  
the  Preface  Nietzsche  clearly  rejects  both  efforts  by  stating  “we  who  are  neither  Jesuits  nor  
democrats.”  (BGE,  Preface)  See  also,  Laurence  Lampert,  Nietzsche’s  Task:  An  Interpretation  of  
Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  14,  where  he  defines  Jesuitism  as  “a  Christian  exercise  in  Platonic  noble  
lying.”    
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Apollonian  and  Dionysian  forces:  he  himself  is  the  profound  abyss  that  contains  the  
most  spiritual  and  strongest  will  to  power  that  fundamentally  affirms  this  world,  and  he  
also  has  the  artfulness  and  resourcefulness  to  give  forms  to  the  fundamental  chaos  of  the  
world,  which  provide  essential  conditions  for  the  life  of  human  beings  in  this  world.  
Although  these  forms  and  doctrines  are  for  the  ordinary  human  beings  real  
commandments  and  orders  (“thou  shalt”),  they  cannot  be  chains  for  the  philosopher,  
since  they  are  fundamentally  products  of  his  will  to  power  (“I  will”).  As  the  truth  itself,  
the  philosopher  is  the  origin  of  contradictory  values.  Although  suffering  occasionally  
from  this  tension,  he  is  still  able  to  live  a  most  joyful  and  productive  life  that  gives  
meaning  to  the  rest  of  human  beings.    
Thus  it  seems  fair  to  agree  with  Michael  A.  Gillespie’s  contention  that  Nietzsche  
marks  the  completion  of  modern  nihilism  that  tries  to  make  man  like  God.28  The  
philosopher  in  Nietzsche’s  understanding  is  indeed  very  much  like  the  Christian  God.  
But  there  are  two  things  that  speak  against  this  accusation  of  nihilism  on  the  part  of  
Nietzsche.  The  first  is  the  fact  that  Nietzsche  does  not  think  just  anyone  can  be  
philosopher.  Nietzsche  argues  precisely  that  only  very  few  people  can  attain  the  
freedom  and  independence  of  a  philosopher  and  thus  can  command  and  legislate.  In  
fact  you  have  to  be  born  and  predestined  to  carry  out  such  a  task  and  bear  such  a  burden.  
Thus  for  ordinary  people,  their  life  should  always  be  governed  by  systems  of  values  and  
                                                                                                              
28  Michael  A.  Gillespie,  Nihilism  before  Nietzsche,  pp.  255  
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laws  that  cannot  be  nihilistic.  In  fact,  Nietzsche  argues  precisely  that  ordinary  people  
cannot  live  without  these  values.  The  second  is  that  the  philosopher  in  Nietzsche’s  sense  
upholds  values  and  an  understanding  of  life  that  is  fundamentally  different  from  what  
the  Christian  God  represents.  Unlike  the  Christian  God  who  is  not  a  part  of  this  world,  
and  hence  symbolizes  a  profound  ressentiment  against  life  on  earth,  Nietzsche’s  
philosopher  fundamentally  affirms  life  on  earth.29  In  particular,  because  he  realizes  the  
fundamental  interdependence  of  both  good  and  evil,  and  thus  is  at  the  same  time  more  
courageous  to  take  risks  as  well  as  being  more  cautious  in  doing  good.  Nietzsche’s  
philosopher  endeavors  to  produce  human  beings  that  are  profoundly  different  from  
those  disciplined  by  Christian  moralities.  Indeed,  just  as  Vattimo  points  out,  “both  the  
subject  as  knowing  and  the  subject  as  willing  belong  to  the  metaphysical  tradition  from  
which  Nietzsche  wishes  to  escape,  which  he  wishes  to  demolish.”30  As  I  will  
demonstrate  in  this  paper  that  the  chasm  between  reason  and  will  is  precisely  one  thing  
that  Nietzsche  intends  to  bridge  as  he  tries  to  correct  the  metaphysical  error  of  
Platonism.  
But  has  this  task  been  successfully  carried  out?  Is  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  merely  a  
preparation  for  “a  philosophy  of  the  future,”  which  just  delineate  the  task  and  goal  but  
                                                                                                              
29  For  example,  in  AC,  Nietzsche  basically  denies  the  values  represented  by  the  Christian  God,  
not  in  favor  of  atheism  in  itself:  “That  we  find  no  God  –  either  in  history  or  in  nature  or  behind  
nature  –  is  not  what  differentiates  us,  but  that  we  experience  what  has  been  revered  as  God,  not  
as  ‘godlike’  but  as  miserable,  as  absurd,  as  harmful,  not  merely  as  an  error  but  as  a  crime  against  
life.”  (AC,  47)  
30  Vattimo,  “Philosophy  as  Ontological  Activity,”  in  Dialogue  with  Nietzsche,  pp.  69  
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not  really  an  exemplar  of  the  philosophy  of  the  future?  Or  is  it  itself  already  “a  
philosophy  of  the  future?”31  The  answer  to  this  question  I  think  is  much  more  
ambiguous,  and  this  ambiguity  actually  touches  upon  an  essential  feature  of  Nietzsche’s  
philosophy:  it  is  a  Versuch,  both  an  experiment  and  a  temptation  that  lure  strong  and  
courageous  souls  onto  the  odyssey  of  spirituality,32  a  journey  most  difficult  and  
dangerous,  yet  full  of  possibilities.  
Thus,  I  think  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  fundamentally  political  philosophy  
because  it  is  a  philosophy  about  man,  about  how  and  who  can  live  the  best  and  highest  
as  a  human  being.  It  is  an  effort  to  break  through  the  “vain  and  overly  enthusiastic  
interpretations  and  connotations  that  have  so  far  been  scrawled  and  painted  over  that  
eternal  basic  text  of  homo  natura”  (BGE,  230)  and  to  uphold  and  praise  an  ideal  of  a  
philosophical  life  (or  a  philosopher)  that  is  in  Nietzsche’s  sense  most  natural  and  truest.  
Nietzsche  endeavors  to  rescue  philosophy  from  dogmatism  and  vulgarization,  to  
recover  its  status  as  a  way  of  living,  not  just  in  the  outer  behavior  and  speech  but  most  
importantly  in  the  soul,  in  the  active  and  dynamic  tension  and  harmony  of  the  
conflicting  forces  in  the  soul,  just  as  in  the  nature.    
                                                                                                              
31  This  is  a  problem  repeatedly  encountered  by  readers  of  BGE,  see  Nehamas,  “Who  is  the  
Philosopher  of  the  Future:  A  Reading  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil”,  pp.  55  
32  Leo  Strauss,  “Note  on  the  Plan  of  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  Studies  in  Platonic  
Philosophy,  pp.  179  
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The  whole  book  of  BGE  can  be  divided  into  two  parts  by  the  fourth  chapter  of  
“Epigrams  and  Interludes.”  On  surface,  it  is  clear  that  the  first  part  is  on  philosophy  and  
religion  while  the  second  part  is  on  morality  and  politics.33  But  since  the  whole  book  is  
concerned  with  philosophy  (as  “a  prelude  to  a  philosophy  of  the  future”),  it  can  be  
misleading  to  divide  the  book  in  such  a  thematic  way.  I  agree  that  the  fourth  chapter  
indeed  marks  a  partition,  but  the  first  three  chapters  Nietzsche  is  more  concerned  with  a  
critical  engagement  with  the  traditional  metaphysical  philosophy/religion,  particularly  
to  analyze  the  error  of  metaphysics  and  to  propose  his  understanding  of  the  world  as  
will  to  power.  The  last  five  chapters  are  trying  to  delineate  what  the  new  
philosophy/philosopher  of  the  future  should  be  like  with  the  hypothesis  of  the  will  to  
power.  Since  different  philosophies/philosophers  are  fundamentally  determined  by  
different  dominant  drives  of  the  soul,  the  central  problem  of  the  second  part  of  the  book  
is  an  examination  of  different  types  of  soul  in  order  to  understand  the  highest  and  
noblest  type,  that  of  the  philosopher.  The  new  values  and  new  tasks  the  new  philosophy  
sets  for  itself  emerge  with  this  critique  and  finally  culminate  in  the  celebration  of  
Dionysus  in  the  final  chapter.  
                                                                                                              
33  Ibid,  pp.  176  
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2. First Part: Dogmatism and the Will to Power 
In  the  Preface  of  BGE  Nietzsche’s  ambiguous  attitude  towards  the  philosophical  
tradition  is  quite  manifest.  Ambiguity  means  both  negative  and  positive  assessment.  
And  one  might  notice  the  difference  in  tone  between  BGE  and  GM  in  its  critique  of  the  
tradition:  while  GM  is  marked  by  much  emotion-­‐‑charged  disparagement1,  BGE’s  
criticism  is  less  harsh  and  is  more  characterized  by  humorous  parody  and  mockery.  
Nietzsche  characterizes  the  whole  tradition  of  dogmatism  as  “a  noble  childishness  and  
tyronism.”  (BGE,  Preface)  On  the  one  hand,  it  has  led  to  the  achievement  of  very  many  
great  things  on  the  earth  and  produced  values  that  are  able  to  “inscribe  themselves  in  
the  hearts  of  humanity  with  eternal  demands.”  (BGE,  Preface)  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  
fundamentally  based  on  the  “most  dangerous  of  all  errors.”  But  after  all  it  seems  that  
Nietzsche  is  not  totally  aversive  to  dangers;  on  the  contrary,  he  might  welcome  dangers  
wholeheartedly.  (BGE,  23)  What  on  earth  does  Nietzsche  think  the  past  philosophies  get  
wrong  and  what  is  laudable  about  them?  Let  us  read  carefully  the  first  three  chapters.  
2.1 “The Religious Interpretation of Existence” 
The  first  aphorism  of  the  whole  book  throws  out  a  striking  problem  that  
Nietzsche  claims  “had  never  even  been  put  so  far.”  (BGE,  1)  That  is,  the  cause  and  value  
of  the  will  to  truth.  Nietzsche  asks,  “why  not  rather  untruth?”  Indeed,  in  the  following  
                                                                                                              
1  That  does  not  mean  GM  doesn’t  include  substantial  passages  on  the  greatness  of  the  tradition.    
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Nietzsche  makes  a  strong  case  for  the  preference  of  “untruth”  over  “truth.”  Does  this  
mean  that  Nietzsche  actually  prefers  untruth  to  truth?  I  intend  to  demonstrate  in  this  
part  that  Nietzsche  regards  that  the  “will  to  truth”  characteristic  of  the  metaphysical  
tradition  of  philosophy  and  religion,  the  dogmatic  pursuit  of  eternal  and  universal  truth,  
as  a  fundamentally  “will  to  untruth.”2  This  “will  to  untruth”  is  necessary  for  life  and  has  
produced  many  great  things  in  the  world.  But  nonetheless,  it  is  still  based  on  untruth  
and  therefore  can  go  dangerously  astray.  Nietzsche’s  goal  thus  is  to  find  a  genuine  and  
healthier  will  to  truth  that  characterizes  the  free  spirit  and  the  philosophers  of  the  future.  
Nietzsche  has  no  intent  to  extirpate  untruth  or  will  to  untruth  altogether  from  the  world  
(he  sees  perhaps  more  than  anyone  else  the  value  of  it),  but  he  urges  and  even  “lures”  
those  chosen  few  to  get  on  the  most  dangerous  and  difficult  journey  of  exploring  the  
“truth.”  
Why  does  Nietzsche  thinks  that  previous  philosophers’  will  to  truth  is  actually  
“will  to  untruth”?  For  Nietzsche  all  philosophies  in  the  past  are  no  more  than  the  
rationalization  or  systemization  of  philosophers’  own  moral  prejudice  or  instinct  instead  
of  the  so-­‐‑called  “drive  to  knowledge”  (BGE,  6):  “It  always  creates  the  world  in  its  own  
image;  it  cannot  do  otherwise,  philosophy  is  this  tyrannical  drive  itself,  the  most  
                                                                                                              
2  Clark  and  Dudrick  names  coins  the  phrase  “will  to  value”  to  express  similar  idea  as  my  “will  to  
untruth.”  But  they  think  that  “will  to  value”  and  “will  to  truth”  are  two  aspects  of  the  will  of  
those  philosophers,  while  I  think  what  Nietzsche  is  trying  to  express,  is  not  that  the  philosophers  
have  two  separate  parts  of  their  will,  but  that  they  are  not  honest  enough  to  realize  or  admit  that  
their  will  to  truth  is  not  genuine.  See,  Maudemarie  Clark  and  David  Dudrick,  The  Soul  of  
Nietzshce’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  47  
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spiritual  will  to  power,  to  the  ‘creation  of  the  world,’  to  the  causa  prima.”  (BGE,  9)3  
Nietzsche  jokes  about  this  by  quoting  a  Latin  saying:  at  the  end  of  the  day  the  
fundamental  conviction  of  the  philosopher  would  “appears  on  the  stage”  and  turn  out  
to  be  a  most  beautiful  and  stubborn  ass.  (BGE,  8)  Those  philosophers  who  are  not  aware  
of  the  existence  or  the  fundamental  effect  of  “this  ass”  are  characterized  by  childishness  
and  moral  naivety,  such  as  Kant  and  Schopenhauer,  who  belong  to  the  “innocent,  rich  
and  still  youthful  period  of  the  German  spirit.”(BGE,  11)  The  Stoics  are  also  such  self-­‐‑
deceivers.  (BGE,  9)  But  there  are  also  philosophers  who  deliberately  “act”  in  such  a  
manner.  For  example,  Plato  and  the  Platonists  are  called  “Dionysiokolakes”  by  Epicurus  
who  accuses  them  that  “they  are  all  actors,  there  is  nothing  genuine  about  them.”  (BGE,  
7)  They  are  not  truly  naïve;  but  they  act  or  talk  like  other  naïve  philosophers.    
What  is  the  root  of  this  universal  naivety/dishonesty?  As  Nietzsche  put  it,  why  
are  “synthetic  judgments  a  priori”  necessary?  (BGE,  4)  Nietzsche  thinks  that  the  root  of  
the  naivety    lies  in  some  kind  of  “instincts”  or  “physiological  demands”,  for  he  thinks  
that  even  if  philosophy  is  “conscious  thinking”  it  is  still  much  the  result  of  one’s  
instincts.  In  other  words,  it  is  “life”  itself  that  demands  it:  Untruth  is  a  condition  of  life,  a  
                                                                                                              
3  Vattimo  also  points  out  that  “what  we  believe  to  be  truth,  the  structure  of  being  in  itself,  is  
nothing  more  than  the  ideological  projection  of  a  certain  form  of  life  –  whether  of  individuals  or  
societies.”  Gianni  Vattimo,  “The  Two  Senses  of  Nihilism  in  Nietzsche,”  Dialogue  with  Nietzsche,  
pp.  136  
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condition  for  the  survival  and  thriving  of  life.  (BGE,  4)  Indeed,  “simplification  and  
falsification”  of  reality  are  crucial  for  life.  (BGE,  24)  
The  most  subtle,  powerful,  and  extreme  form  of  “simplification  and  falsification”  
is  perhaps  religion.  For  Nietzsche,  philosophy  in  the  past  is  fundamentally  identical  
with  religion  in  structure  because  both  are  systematized  doctrines  of  some  kind  of  basic  
drive  or  drives  in  the  soul  to  create  the  world  in  its  own  image,  thus  falsifying  it  in  order  
to  enjoy/endure  life.  It  is  even  more  tyrannical  than  philosophy  because  the  simple  
command  of  “belief”  excludes  all  other  competing  drives:  it  requires  in  Pascal’s  case  “a  
continual  suicide  of  reason.”  (BGE,  46)  And  monotheism  is  certainly  more  tyrannical  
and  monstrous  than  polytheism,  but  it  also  exhibits  the  greatest  power:  the  Old  
Testament,  which  “invents”  the  holy  God,  possesses  “so  grand  a  style”  that  Greek  and  
India  literature  cannot  compare.  (BGE,  52)  Even  the  world’s  most  powerful  people  felt  
the  need  to  “bow  to  the  saint”  because  in  the  saint  “they  sensed  a  new  power,  a  strange,  
as  yet  unconquered  enemy.”  (BGE,  51)  
But  in  all  these  demonstrations  of  grandiose  power  Nietzsche  senses  most  
astutely  the  greatest  weakness:  the  fear  of  truth.  Precisely  because  they  stick  so  
desperately  to  their  “truth,”  they  turn  their  back  on  what  is  “behind”  or  “beneath”  that  
“truth,”  hence  refuse  to  confront  “the  whole  truth.”  Nietzsche  acknowledges  the  
profound  wisdom  contained  in  this  attachment  to  “the  surface”  and  “the  superficiality,”  
for  the  reckless  plunging  “beneath  the  surface”  has  led  to  “disastrous  results.”  And  this  
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will  to  untruth,  this  “cult  of  surfaces,”  created  by  philosophers  and  artists,  and  most  of  
all  homines  religiosi,  has  promoted  human  beings  to  achieve  great  things  on  the  earth.  
(BGE,  59;  Preface)  He  is  neither  unaware  of  nor  ungrateful  to  that.  But  he  knew  that  this  
is  not  without  problem:  
“It is the profound, suspicious fear of an incurable pessimism that forces whole 
millennia to bury their teeth in and cling to a religious interpretation of existence: the 
fear of that instinct which senses that one might get a hold of the truth too soon, before 
man has become strong enough, hard enough, artist enough.” (BGE, 59) 
Thus,  for  Nietzsche,  philosophies  and  religions  before  him,  namely  Platonism  
and  Christianity  (which  is  Platonism  for  the  people),  are  fundamentally  “religious  
interpretation  of  existence.”  However  systematized  and  rationalized  they  may  be,  they  
are  still  at  the  bottom  based  on  instincts,  not  consciousness  (BGE,  3),  based  on  the  
instinctive  attachment  to  human  life,  not  on  reason  (BGE,  24;  39;  46).4  Nietzsche  denies  
the  simple  equation  or  correlation  between  truth  and  good  human  life:  “when  a  human  
being  is  too  human  about  it  –  ‘he  seeks  the  true  only  to  do  the  good.’  –  I  bet  he  finds  
nothing.”  (BGE,  35);  or  between  truth  and  happiness:  “Happiness  and  virtue  are  no  
arguments….  Something  might  be  true  while  being  harmful  and  dangerous  in  the  
highest  degree.”  (BGE,  39)  Truth  is  not  lovable;  it  is  most  terrible.  Hence  those  “truths”  
                                                                                                              
4  Similarly  in  AC,  Nietzsche  argues  that  philosophers  of  the  past  are  fundamentally  a  “priestly  
type:”  “When  we  consider  that  the  philosopher  is  merely  the  next  development  of  the  priestly  
type,  then  this  legacy  of  the  priest,  this  self-­‐‑deceiving  counterfeit,  ceases  to  be  surprising.”  (AC,  
12)  
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that  are  pleasant  and  beautiful  cannot  be  the  product  of  will  to  truth,  but  only  will  to  
untruth.  
Now  this  “religious  interpretation  of  existence”  has  started  to  crumble.  Why?  
Because  human  beings  have  gradually  grown  up.  They  are  starting  to  get  rid  of  their  
childishness.  (cf.  BGE,  5,  34,  57)  Paradoxically,  once  they  cannot  genuinely  believe  in  
their  own  “truth,”  their  “truth”  ceases  to  have  a  life-­‐‑promoting  force.5  Now  nihilism  and  
pessimism  threatens  to  take  over  Europe.  Before  we  look  more  closely  into  Nietzsche’s  
solution,  let  us  go  back  a  step  and  examine  the  understanding  of  truth  that  have  
dominated  the  thinking  of  Europe  for  two  millennia  and  what  Nietzsche  holds  should  
be  the  correct  understanding  of  truth.  
2.2 The Error of the Past Philosophers and the “Truth” of 
Nietzsche 
In  the  previous  part  I  have  argued  that  Nietzsche  holds  that  the  past  
philosophers’  and  religion’s  will  to  truth  is  actually  will  to  untruth.  In  this  part,  I  want  
explain  further  why  Nietzsche  thinks  that  this  error  is  due  to  the  philosophers’  human,  
all  too  human  instincts,  which  make  them  blind  to  the  ultimate  motivation  for  their  
creative  philosophizing.  In  other  words,  they  are  decisively  lacking  in  self-­‐‑knowledge.  
                                                                                                              
5  Strauss  says  that  “God  died”  does  not  merely  mean  “men  have  ceased  to  believe  in  God.”  But  it  
means  that  “even  while  God  lived  he  never  was  what  the  believers  in  him  thought  him  to  be,  
namely,  deathless.  Theism  as  it  understood  itself  was  therefore  always  wrong.  Yet  for  a  time  it  
was  true,  i.e.,  powerful,  life-­‐‑giving.”  Leo  Strauss,  “Note  on  the  Plan  of  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  
and  Evil,”  Studies  in  Platonic  Philosophy,  pp.  179  
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This  is  why  Nietzsche  thinks  they  are  childish  or  naïve,  albeit  great.  By  critiquing  the  
philosophers’  of  the  past,  Nietzsche  is  able  to  envision  a  different  kind  of  understanding  
of  truth  and  therewith  a  new  type  of  will  to  truth.  This  new  type  of  will  to  truth  must  
acquire  the  self-­‐‑knowledge  that  this  will  to  truth  is  fundamentally  a  manifestation  of  the  
will  to  power  and  it  is  inextricably  linked  to  the  will  to  untruth.6      
The  beginning  of  aphorism  2  explains  what  Nietzsche  thinks  is  the  “typical  
prejudgment  and  prejudice”  of  “the  metaphysicians  of  all  ages.”  “The  fundamental  faith  
of  the  metaphysicians  is  the  faith  in  opposite  values:”    
“[T]he things of the highest value must have another, peculiar origin – they 
cannot be derived from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, paltry world, from this 
turmoil of delusion and lust. Rather from the lap of Being, the intransitory, the hidden 
god, the “thing-in-itself” – there must be their basis, and nowhere else.” (BGE, 2) 
Nietzsche  disputes  this  faith  by  proposing  two  possibilities:  first,  it  is  possible  
that  there  are  no  opposites  at  all;  second,  the  valuations  and  opposite  values  of  past  
metaphysicians  are  “merely  foreground  estimates,”  “a  higher  and  more  fundamental  
value  for  life  might  have  to  be  ascribed  to  deception,  selfishness,  and  lust.”  (BGE,  2)  In  
the  next  aphorism  he  mentions  again  “foreground  estimates:”  
“Behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, too, there stand 
valuations or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type 
of life….such estimates might be, in spite of their regulative importance for us, 
nevertheless mere foreground estimates, a certain kind of niaiserie which may be 
                                                                                                              
6  Tracy  Strong  points  out  that  will  to  power  in  German  is  “Wille  zur  Macht,”  Macht  is  related  to  
machen  which  means  “to  make.”  So  will  to  power  is  essentially  related  to  creation,  production  or  
fabrication.  Tracy  Strong,  Nietzsche  and  the  Politics  of  transfiguration,  pp.  219  
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necessary for the preservation of just such beings as we are. Supposing, that is, that not 
just man is the ‘measure of things.’” – (BGE, 3) 
Thus,  the  last  sentence  of  the  paragraph  reminds  us  that  the  metaphysical  faith  in  
the  opposite  values  and  peculiar  origin  of  the  Good  is  actually  the  result  of  
anthropocentrism.7  We  human  beings,  in  order  to  survive,  starting  from  ourselves,  have  
invented  “truths”  and  therefore  “untruth.”8  This  is  manifest  in  a  lot  of  the  prejudices  of  
philosophers  of  the  past.  
For  Nietzsche,  materialism  (or  sensualism)  and  idealism  alike  are  both  the  result  
of  unreflected,  instinctive  belief  in  ourselves.  Both  are  fundamentally  anthropocentric.  
The  central  aphorism  of  the  first  chapter  deals  with  one  of  the  central  assumptions  of  the  
philosophy  of  the  past:  atomism.  Nietzsche  thinks  that  material  atomism  actually  comes  
from  the  credulous  trust  in  senses:  “Boscovich  has  taught  us  to  abjure  the  belief  in  the  
last  part  of  the  earth  that  ‘stood  fast…it  is  the  greatest  triumph  over  the  senses  that  has  
been  gained  on  earth  so  far.”  (BGE,  12)  But  he  immediately  warns  us  that  another  type  
of  atomism,  the  “soul  atomism”  is  yet  to  be  overcome,  namely  “the  soul  as  something  
indestructible,  eternal,  indivisible,  as  a  monad,  as  an  atomon.”  This  is  what  “Christianity  
has  taught  best  and  longest.”  (BGE,  12)  Nietzsche  thinks  that  the  whole  modern  
                                                                                                              
7  Clark  and  Dubrick  argue  that  Nietzsche,  like  Kant,  thinks  that  the  great  error  of  the  
metaphysicians  is  their  uncritical  faith  in  the  capacity  of  natural  reason  to  know  the  truth.  I’ve  
elaborated  on  this  view  in  the  previous  section,  but  I  think  the  most  important  point  is  the  faith  in  
the  different  origins  of  opposite  values.  See,  Maudemarie  Clark  and  David  Dubrick,  The  Soul  of  
Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  24  
8  Leo  Strauss,  “Note  on  the  Plan  of  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  Studies  in  Platonic  
Philosophy,  pp.  177  
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philosophy  is  just  such  an  attempt  to  “assassinate  the  old  soul  concept,  under  the  guise  
of  a  critique  of  the  subject-­‐‑and-­‐‑predicate  concept.”  (BGE,  54)  Nietzsche  continues  to  
carry  out  this  attempt  and  finally  radicalizes  it  by  drawing  its  final  conclusion.    
The  “soul  atomism”  is  inextricably  related  to  many  of  the  important  concepts  in  
metaphysics,  such  as  “immediate  certainty,”  “ego,”  “free  will,”  “cause  and  effect,”  
which  Nietzsche  makes  a  detailed  critique  in  the  first  chapter.  The  basic  idea  of  
Nietzsche’s  criticism  is  that  when  we  describe  a  thing  that  happens,  the  grammatical  
habit  requires  the  supposition  of  a  subject  as  the  “cause”  of  what  has  happened.  But  in  
reality,  it  is  only  one  type  of  interpretation  of  the  process.  There  is  another  possibility  
that  no  such  temporally  stable  and  identical  subject  exists.  What  has  happened  just  
happens  without  having  any  single  prior  cause  that  necessarily  leads  to  it.  (BGE,  17,  21,  
54)  In  other  words,  Nietzsche  would  rather  talk  about  “process”  than  about  “substance.”  
He  thinks  that  “substance”  is  only  a  kind  of  useful  fiction  and  grammatical  assumption  
(BGE,  20),  but  the  reality  is  the  constantly  changing  flux  that  consists  of  nothing  but  
forces  in  all  directions.9  For  Nietzsche,  this  kind  of  trust  in  the  unity  and  singularity  of  
substance  is  also  a  kind  of  “popular  prejudice.”  He  is  not  refuting  it  by  arguing  that  it  is  
wrong  or  false,  but  he  is  profoundly  dissatisfied  by  the  philosophers’  uncritical  adoption  
                                                                                                              
9  This  understanding  of  reality,  not  in  terms  of  substance  but  in  terms  of  forces,  is  also  
characteristic  of  the  modern  physics.  See,  Gareth  Southwell,  A  Beginner’s  Guide  to  Nietzsche’s  
Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  116  
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of  such  popular  prejudices.  So  at  the  end  of  the  day,  they  are  still  “human,  all  too  
human.”  (BGE,  19)10  
So  Nietzsche’s  alternative  to  “soul  atomism”  is  his  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power.  I  
think  for  Nietzsche,  the  chief  merit  of  this  doctrine  is  that  it  is  much  less  anthropocentric  
than  all  the  other  metaphysical  assumptions.  Human  beings  can  be  understood  in  the  
same  terms  as  all  the  other  phenomena  in  nature.  In  the  first  part,  Nietzsche  explains  the  
will  to  power  mainly  in  aphorism  19  and  36.  In  these  two  aphorisms  Nietzsche  
endeavors  to  devise  a  theory  that  serves  as  a  foundational  assumption  for  the  
interpretations  of  both  natural  phenomena  and  human  life.  
Nietzsche  first  explains  his  understanding  of  the  phenomenon  of  willing.  First,  
he  thinks  that  willing  is  not  a  unity  but  a  complex  mixture  of  different  sensations  and  
thoughts.  Second,  he  holds  that  willing  is  “above  all  an  affect,  and  specifically  the  affect  
of  the  command.”  Every  act  of  willing  renders  something  in  us  obedient.  Thus,  in  an  act  
of  willing  there  are  always  a  duality  in  us,  the  commanding  part  and  the  obedient  part.  
By  identifying  ourselves  with  the  commanding  part,  we  enjoy  “an  increase  of  the  
sensation  of  power.”  But  this  is  at  the  expense  of  ignoring  the  duality  of  willing.  By  
comparing  our  body  to  “a  social  structure  composed  of  many  souls,”  Nietzsche  actually  
                                                                                                              
10  See  also,  Tracy  Strong,  Nietzsche  and  the  Politics  of  Transfiguration,  pp.  50  
  36  
claims  that  every  act  of  willing  is  a  political  act,  “a  question  of  commanding  and  
obeying.”  (BGE,  19)11  
Here  we  can  see  that  Nietzsche  understands  will  chiefly  in  terms  of  willing,  as  a  
process  of  commanding  and  obeying,  rather  than  any  fixed  or  relatively  stable  
substance.  What  is  “given”  is  merely  the  drives  in  us,  which  are  nothing  but  random  
forces  that  exist  in  nature.  (BGE,  36)  Hence,  Nietzsche’s  doctrine  of  will  to  power  is  
different  from  that  of  Hobbes,  in  that  even  though  for  Hobbes  the  pursuit  of  power  is  
ceaseless,  power  is  chiefly  a  tool  to  acquire  happiness.  But  for  Nietzsche,  the  meaning  of  
power  is  in  its  exercising  itself.12  Power  is  power  only  when  you  exercise  it,  when  you  
discharge  it.  (BGE,  13)  Understood  in  this  light,  will  to  power  can  apply  to  explain  
everything  in  nature,  even  the  mechanistic  world.  All  these  movements,  functions  and  
activities  are  the  results  of  discharging  the  enormous  power  in  the  world.  The  only  
problem,  is  whether  you  want  to  “explain  the  world”  at  all.  13  For  Nietzsche,  “to  explain”  
means  to  posit  causality,  and  to  posit  causality  we  have  to  recognize  “the  will  as  
efficient.”  (BGE,  36)  For  example,  a  stone  falls  on  the  ground  because  the  will  to  power  in  
                                                                                                              
11  Haar  also  explains  that  the  will  to  power  “possesses  a  fundamental  reflexivity,  it  always  
overcomes  itself,  through  action  or  reaction.  At  its  origin  it  presents  itself  to  itself  as  a  chaotic  and  
contradictory  diversity  of  elementary  impulses.”  Haar,  Nietzsche  and  Metaphysics,  pp.  9  
12  See  also,  Walter  Kaufmann,  Nietzsche:  Philosopher,  Psychologist,  Antichrist,  pp.  360  
13  This  can  be  compared  with  a  passage  in  Z,  “Indeed,  this  ego  and  the  ego’s  contradiction  and  
confusion  still  speak  most  honestly  of  its  being  –  this  creating,  willing,  valuing  ego,  which  is  the  
measure  and  value  of  things.”  (Z,  “On  the  afterworldly”);  Also  in  AC,  “Life  itself  is  to  my  mind  
the  instinct  for  growth,  for  durability,  for  an  accumulation  of  forces,  for  power:  where  the  will  to  
power  is  lacking  there  is  decline.”  (AC,  First  Book,  6)  
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it  dictates  that  it  discharge  its  power  of  gravity.  But  when  a  man  throws  it  up  in  the  air,  
the  will  of  the  man  discharging  his  power  is  stronger  than  the  stone’s  tendency  to  
discharge  its  power  (“will  to  power”).  Nietzsche  thinks  that  “cause  and  effect,”  if  at  all,  
can  only  be  understood  in  terms  of  strong  and  weak  wills.    
It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, for-each-other, constraint, 
number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol 
world into things as if it existed “in itself,” we act once more as we have always acted – 
mythologically. The “unfree will” is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong 
and weak wills. (BGE, 21) 
Thus,  for  Nietzsche,  the  world  in  itself  has  no  order  or  law  at  all;  it  is  simply  a  
constant  flux  of  powers.14  But  if  we  have  to  make  sense  of  it,  namely  positing  causality  
onto  it,  the  minimum  we  can  do  is  to  understand  it  in  terms  of  the  will  to  power.15  So  in  
aphorism  36,  Nietzsche  says  that  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of  will  to  power  to  the  
whole  world  is  demanded  by  “the  conscience  of  method.”  But  nonetheless,  Nietzsche  
                                                                                                              
14  Clark  argues  in  her  book  Nietzsche  on  Truth  and  Philosophy  that  Nietzsche  in  his  later  work  
abandons  the  view  that  previous  philosophies  falsified  the  reality,  since  he  rejects  the  existence  of  
a  true  world  or  thing-­‐‑in-­‐‑itself.  (Maudemarie  Clark,  Nietzsche  on  Truth  and  Philosophy,  pp.  117)  
But  I  think  at  least  judging  from  BGE,  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power  still  claims  to  be  an  
interpretation  of  nature  and  Nietzsche  still  holds  onto  homo  natura.  I  think  the  more  plausible  
contention  is  that  Nietzsche  denies  the  metaphysics  of  fixed  and  unchanging  substance  but  still  
presupposes  a  world,  a  substratum  that  contains  chaotic  powers  and  forces.    
15  A  similar  passage  in  Z  says  explicitly  that  a  will  to  truth  is  “a  will  to  the  thinkability  of  all  
beings…You  want  to  make  all  being  thinkable,  for  you  doubt  with  well-­‐‑founded  suspicion  that  it  
is  already  thinkable.  But  it  shall  yield  and  bend  for  you.  Thus  your  will  wants  it…That  is  your  
whole  will,  you  who  are  wisest:  a  will  to  power  –  when  you  speak  of  good  and  evil  too,  and  of  
valuations.  You  still  want  to  create  the  world  before  which  you  can  kneel:  that  is  your  ultimate  
hope  and  intoxication.”  (Z,  “On  self-­‐‑overcoming”)  
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does  not  claim  it  is  the  truth.  The  most  he  says  is  that  “we  have  to  make  the  experiment  
of  positing  the  causality  of  the  will  hypothetically  as  the  only  one.”  (BGE,  36)16  
Now  it  is  clear  that  what  Nietzsche  fundamentally  opposes  to  the  teachings  of  
the  metaphysicians.  As  we  can  see  from  the  first  paragraph  of  aphorism  2,  their  “error”  
is  not  so  much  the  faith  in  the  opposite  values,  as  in  the  opposite  origins  of  the  opposite  
values:  they  insist  that  the  good  things  in  the  world  have  a  different  origin  from  the  bad  
things,  whereas  Nietzsche  wants  to  experiment  with  the  possibility,  as  is  demanded  by  
“the  conscience  of  method,”  that  they  actually  have  the  same  origin  –  the  will  to  power.17  
Just  as  willing  is  the  cause  of  both  commanding  and  obeying,  both  enjoyment  and  pain,  
a  single  act  of  the  will  to  power  necessarily  divides  the  world  into  two:  the  stronger  and  
the  weaker,  the  cause  and  the  effect,  the  subject  and  the  object,  the  truth  and  the  untruth.  
Philosophizing  thus  is  fundamentally  anthropocentric  and  hence  political.  The  doctrine  
of  will  to  power  is  the  least  anthropocentric  doctrine  because  it  is  fully  aware  of  the  
anthropocentricism  of  all  philosophies.  It  is  a  doctrine  that  has  self-­‐‑knowledge.  
Immediately  after  the  his  explanation  of  the  doctrine  of  will  to  power  in  
aphorism  36,  Nietzsche  writes  the  following  aphorism:  
“What? Doesn’t this mean, to speak with the vulgar: God is refuted, but the devil 
is not?” On the contrary! On the contrary, my friends. And, the devil – who forces you to 
speak with the vulgar?” (BGE, 37) 
                                                                                                              
16  Southwell  also  understands  the  will  to  power  in  terms  of  causation:  the  traditional  separation  
of  physical  causation  and  will  are  rejected  by  Nietzsche  and  replaced  by  the  doctrine  of  the  will  
to  power.  Gareth  Southwell,  A  Beginner’s  Guide  to  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  40  
17  See  also,  Stuart  Dalton,  “Beginnings  and  Endings  in  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  pp.  60  
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One  is  reminded  of  the  third  aphorism  of  GM’s  preface,  where  Nietzsche  says  in  
his  “first  philosophical  effort,”  he  writes  about  the  origin  of  evil,  and  he  attributes  that  to  
God  as  a  kind  of  “honor.”  (GM,  Preface)  Nietzsche  seems  to  think  that  only  the  vulgar  
believes  that  good  and  evil  have  different  origins.  Nietzsche  thinks  that  he  knows  better,  
that  good  and  evil  both  have  their  origins  in  the  willing.  But  he  is  also  cautious  enough  
to  take  it  as  only  a  hypothesis  and  intends  to  experiment  with  it.18  The  doctrine  of  the  
will  to  power  is  after  all  the  manifestation  of  Nietzsche’s  will  to  power  –  he  does  not  
deny  it:  what  is  his  motivation  and  what  could  be  the  result?  To  what  type  of  
philosophical  enterprise  should  he  need  such  “hypothesis?”  
2.3 Why the Will to Truth? Independence and Command 
From  the  previous  analysis  we  can  see  that  Nietzsche  criticizes  the  philosophers  
before  him,  not  so  much  because  they  are  wrong  in  the  sense  of  positing  their  own  ideals  
onto  the  world  and  nature,  as  they  lack  self-­‐‑knowledge:  they  are  not  aware  of  or  they  do  
not  examine  critically  what  truly  motivates  their  pursuit  and  determines  the  shape  of  
their  philosophy.  They  are  therefore  childish  and  naïve.  But,  philosophizing,  as  the  most  
spiritual  form  of  will  to  power,  is  still  respected  by  Nietzsche.  Although  he  seems  to  
attack  the  falseness  and  hypocrisy  of  Christianity  ruthlessly,  he  still  respects  religious  
life  and  instincts  and  dismisses  the  modern  “indifference  toward  religious  
                                                                                                              
18  Van  Tongeren  also  argues  that  the  doctrine  of  will  to  power  “denotes  an  interpretative  
perspective  which  planks  itself  opposite  other  interpretations.”  Paul  J.M.  van  Togeren,  
Reinterpreting  Modern  Culture:  An  Introduction  to  Nietzsche’s  Philosophy,  pp.  161  
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matters.”(BGE,  58)  Thus,  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power,  is  not  supposed  to  take  the  
place  of  all  previous  philosophies,  but  is  to  provide  a  starting  point,  an  experimental  
hypothesis,  that  future  philosophies  could  build  on  to  create  new  visions  of  the  world.  
But  before  that,  we  should  consider  another  problem:  why  does  Nietzsche  insist  on  
using  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power  as  a  working  hypothesis?  Granted  that  Nietzsche  
makes  it  clear  that  this  doctrine  is  the  least  anthropocentric  and  hence  has  the  most  self-­‐‑
knowledge,  does  this  alone  make  it  preferable  to  other  less  “truthful”  doctrines?  In  other  
words,  if  truth  is  terrible  and  deadly,  Nietzsche  still  has  to  account  for  his  own  will  to  
truth.  
The  first  reason  is  I  think  necessity  of  circumstances.  Just  as  Nietzsche  says  in  the  
Preface  of  BGE,  that  Platonism  has  been  overcome  is  already  a  fact  in  Europe.  Modern  
philosophy,  by  attacking  the  old  concept  of  soul  in  Christianity,  has  already  destroyed  
much  of  Christianity’s  spell  over  Europe.  (BGE,  54)  God  as  “father,”  “judge,”  “the  
rewarder,”  and  his  “free  will,”  have  all  been  refuted.  (BGE,  53)  The  doctrine  of  the  will  
to  power  only  draws  the  final  conclusion  of  modern  philosophy  so  that  it  gets  rid  of  the  
last  residue  of  Christianity  and  Platonism,  so  that  it  can  finally  come  to  itself.  (BGE,  56)  
For  Nietzsche,  this  is  as  inevitable  as  a  child  would  grow  up  and  grow  old:  
With the strength of his spiritual eye and insight grows distance and, as it were, 
the space around man: his world becomes more profound; ever new stars, ever new 
riddles and images become visible for him. Perhaps everything on which the spirit’s eye 
has exercised its acuteness and thoughtfulness was nothing but an occasion for this 
exercise, a playful matter, a something for children and those who are childish. (BGE, 
57) 
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The  spirit’s  eye  must  become  more  acute  and  see  more  things  than  ever;  this  
process  itself  is  what  the  spirit’s  eye  exists  for,  from  childish  to  mature,  from  naïve  to  
sophisticated.  But  immediately  in  the  same  aphorism  Nietzsche  claims  that  “‘the  old  
man’  will  then  be  in  need  of  another  toy  and  another  pain  –  still  child  enough,  an  eternal  
child.”  (BGE,  57)19  It  thus  seems  that  for  Nietzsche,  modern  philosophy  and  the  doctrine  
of  will  to  power,  after  all,  are  not  the  end  of  the  story.  They  too  must  be  overcome.  
Still,  the  argument  of  historical  necessity  is  not  sufficient  to  account  for  why  
Nietzsche  wants  to  play  out  the  final  conclusion  of  modern  philosophy.  Another  
possibility  has  already  been  suggested  in  the  previous  part,  that  is  the  intellectual  
conscience  (“the  conscience  of  method.”  BGE,  45).  One  thing  Nietzsche  faults  with  the  
previous  philosophers  is  precisely  that  they  are  not  honest  enough  to  question  or  
examine  their  own  instincts  and  faiths,  such  as  the  faith  in  the  opposite  values.20  But  
“truth”  or  “truthfulness”  is  far  from  unquestionably  good  for  Nietzsche.  It  is  even  very  
wicked  or  evil.  Yet,  it  seems  that  Nietzsche  has  determined  to  take  this  risk  and  be  
                                                                                                              
19  In  “On  the  three  metamorphoses”  in  Z,  Nietzsche  explains  that  the  final  stage  of  
metamorphoses  should  be  “child”  again,  which  corresponds  to  the  assertion  here:  “The  child  is  
innocence  and  forgetting,  a  new  beginning,  a  game,  a  self-­‐‑propelled  wheel,  a  first  movement,  a  
sacred  ‘Yes.’  For  the  game  of  creation,  my  bothers,  a  sacred  ‘Yes’  is  needed:  the  spirit  now  wills  
his  own  will,  and  he  who  had  been  lost  to  the  world  now  conquers  his  own  world.”  (Z,  “On  the  
three  metamorphoses)  “The  child”  is  thus  characterized  by  its  creating  ability.    
20  Similarly,  in  Z,  Nietzsche  argues  that  previous  philosophers,  namely  those  who  are  deemed  to  
be  “wise  men,”  are  in  fact  “servants  of  the  people,”  not  servants  of  truth.  For  Nietzsche  those  
philosophers  remain  essentially  “part  of  the  people.”  (Z,  “On  the  famous  wise  men.”)  
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“evil.”  He  is  determined  to  overcome  the  innocence  or  moral  naivety  of  the  past  
philosophers:  “after  all  we  should  not  be  ‘merely  moral’  men.”  (BGE,  34)  
[A] philosopher has nothing less than a right to “bad character,” as the being 
who has so far always been fooled best on earth; he has a duty to suspicion today, to 
squint maliciously out of every abyss of suspicion. (BGE, 34) 
Thus,  for  Nietzsche,  it  is  the  “right  and  duty”  of  philosopher  to  suspect  and  
question  everything,  even  if  this  is  “imprudent”  and  even  “wicked.”  It  is  a  playful  
exercise  of  the  spiritual  eye  that  demands  it.  (BGE,  57)  It  would  seem  that  Nietzsche,  too,  
is  dominated  by  the  will  to  truth  as  much  as  the  previous  philosophers.  The  difference  is  
that  previous  philosophers  have  relied  on  assumptions  that  they  don’t  question,  namely  
that  truth  is  good  and  lovable,  therefore  philosophizing  is  good  and  laudable.  Nietzsche  
questions  even  that.  Previous  philosophers  do  not  question  the  act  of  philosophizing  
itself  or  the  philosopher  himself.  Hence  they  must  lack  self-­‐‑knowledge.  Nietzsche,  on  
the  contrary,  takes  philosophizing  and  the  philosopher  as  a  problem.  (TI,  “The  Problem  
of  Socrates”)  
What  reward  could  come  from  this  radical  intellectual  conscience  now  that  the  
correlation  between  truth  and  goodness  is  in  doubt?  Does  Nietzsche  seek  any  reward  at  
all?  If  he  does  not,  he  would  fall  into  a  paradoxical  position  in  which  he  claims  to  
question  the  value  of  the  will  to  truth,  but  in  reality  he  himself  still  relies  on  the  highest  
authority  of  intellectual  conscience  (or  the  unconditional  will  to  truth)  to  justify  his  
questioning.  In  aphorism  64  he  expressly  claims  that  “knowledge  for  its  own  sake”  is  the  
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“last  snare  of  morality:  with  that  one  becomes  completely  entangled  in  it  once  more.”  
Therefore  I  doubt  that  is  what  Nietzsche  could  accept.  He  says  explicitly,  after  claiming  
that  curiosity  is  perhaps  “the  most  agreeable  of  all  vices,”  that  “the  love  of  truth  has  its  
reward  in  heaven  and  even  on  earth.”  (BGE,  45)  What  could  be  the  reward  of  the  love  of  
truth  on  earth?    
Looking  at  the  first  three  chapters,  I  think  the  values  that  Nietzsche  most  
cherishes  and  thinks  are  fundamentally  related  to  truth  and  truthfulness,  are  freedom  
and  independence,  and  based  on  that,  the  art  of  commanding.  (BGE,  29,  41,  43,  44)  In  
other  words,  Nietzsche  may  secretly  agree  with  Plato  in  that  both  pictures  the  
philosopher  as  the  king,  but  the  difference  seems  to  be  that  Nietzsche’s  philosopher  is  
king  due  to  his  freedom  and  independence,  while  Plato’s  philosopher  king  is  
characterized  by  his  knowledge  of  the  Good.  But  it  is  possible  that  they  are  only  
seemingly  different.  This  is  also  compatible  with  his  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power:  in  the  
sense  that  the  philosopher  overcomes  and  has  the  most  profound  knowledge  of  all  the  
other  passions  that  rule  the  rest  of  human  beings,  his  complete  freedom/independence  
and  supreme  art  of  commanding  gives  him  the  supreme  power  over  the  rest  of  human  
beings.  His  will  to  power  cannot  be  any  better  fulfilled.    
Judging  from  Nietzsche’s  standard  the  previous  philosophers  are  still  unfree  
because  they  are  dogmatically  attached  to  their  own  “truth.”  They  are  not  aware  that  
one’s  own  truth  is  not  necessarily  the  truth  of  everyone:  “great  things  remain  for  the  
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great,  abysses  for  the  profound,  nuances  and  shudders  for  the  refined,  and,  in  brief,  all  
that  is  rare  for  the  rare.”  (BGE,  43)  So  the  coming  philosophers  will  be  the  friends  of  
“truth”  but  certainly  not  dogmatists.  Therefore  they  would  not  sacrifice  themselves  for  
their  truth.  (BGE,  25,  31)  They  will  wear  masks  and  move  as  fast  as  a  rapidly  flowing  
river  with  a  presto  tempo.  (BGE,  25,  27,  28,  40)  
Philosophy  used  to  be  a  tragedy  because  the  spirit  necessarily  invents  “the  
erroneousness  of  the  world,”  “the  falseness  of  the  world.”  (BGE,  34)  Philosophers  are  
thus  “forced”  to  become  the  martyr.  (BGE,  25)  But  Nietzsche  believes  that  “[t]here  are  
heights  of  the  soul  from  which  even  tragedy  ceases  to  look  tragic;  and  rolling  together  
all  the  woe  of  the  world  –  who  could  dare  to  decide  whether  its  sight  would  necessarily  
seduce  us  and  compel  us  to  feel  pity  and  thus  double  this  woe?”  (BGE,  30)  The  
attainment  of  these  heights  requires  a  very  strong  soul.    
Indeed,  the  freedom  and  independence  one  can  obtain,  which  is  determined  by  
the  amount  of  truth  one  can  endure,  is  dependent  on  how  strong  and  daring  one  is.  
(BGE,  29)  A  man  must  test  himself  a  lot  in  order  to  know  whether  he  is  born  to  be  
independent  and  commanding.  He  should  not  remain  stuck  to  a  lot  of  things  that  are  so  
dear  to  him  in  order  to  “conserve  oneself:”  fatherland,  pity,  a  science,  even  one’s  own  
virtue  and  detachment.  (BGE,  41)  Nietzsche  quotes  Stendhal,  “A  banker  who  has  made  a  
fortune  has  one  character  trait  that  is  needed  for  making  discoveries  in  philosophy,  that  
is  to  say,  for  seeing  clearly  into  what  is.”  (BGE,  40)  
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On  such  a  spiritual  journey  the  philosopher  remains  mostly  and  necessarily  in  
solitude  (BGE,  25,  29).  Does  this  mean  that  the  philosopher  is  apolitical  and  remains  
detached  from  the  rest  of  human  beings?  What  is  the  relationship  between  the  
philosopher  and  the  rest  of  human  beings?  Does  he  love  them?  In  Plato  the  philosopher  
has  to  be  “coerced”  to  rule;  but  Nietzsche’s  answer  seems  to  be  quite  ambiguous.21  He  
does  claim  that  “to  love  man  for  God’s  sake  –  that  has  so  far  been  the  noblest  and  most  
remote  feeling  attained  among  men.”  Man  himself  is  not  lovable;  there  should  be  some  
“ulterior  intent  to  sanctify”  the  love  of  man.  (BGE,  60)  But  Nietzsche  does  not  specify  
what  this  “ulterior  intent”  is.  Could  it  be  the  will  to  power?  
What  is  certain  is  that  the  new  philosophers  would  rule  differently  from  the  
previous  ones.  Whereas  previous  philosophers  preach  their  own  truth  to  the  crowd  in  
the  hope  that  they  would  accept  it,  the  new  philosophers  need  to  know  the  art  of  
commanding  better.  They  do  not  share  their  truth  with  anyone  else.  They  use  religion  as  
a  means  to  command,  to  cultivate  and  educate  people.  (BGE,  61,  62)  Here,  Nietzsche  
makes  a  sharp  distinction  between  philosophy  and  religion,  and  insists  religion  should  
always  remain  a  tool  of  philosophy.  If  we  recall  that  Nietzsche  says  Christianity  is  
Platonism  for  the  people  (BGE,  Preface)  and  previous  philosophies  are  nothing  less  than  
                                                                                                              
21  One  important  view  is  that  Nietzsche  only  cares  about  those  elite  persons  and  want  to  liberate  
them  from  their  moral  feelings,  but  does  not  care  about  the  rest  of  society.  See,  Brian  Leiter,  
"ʺNietzsche'ʹs  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy,"ʺ  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Spring  2013  
Edition),  Edward  N.  Zalta  (ed.)  
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“a  religious  interpretation  of  existence,”  (BGE,  59)  it  seems  that  he  takes  the  previous  
philosophies  to  be  more  like  religion  than  philosophy.    
Nietzsche  has  made  it  clear  that  the  opposite  values  actually  have  the  same  
origin,  namely  the  will  to  power,  and  therefore  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  if  the  
philosopher’s  task  is  to  raise  his  soul  to  the  highest  possible  height,  it  becomes  also  
imperative  that  he  go  down  to  the  lowest  possible  level.  (BGE,  26)  This  is  what  
Nietzsche  sets  out  to  do  in  the  following  chapters,  namely  to  explore  the  depths  of  the  
soul  as  the  hunter  in  the  forest.  (BGE,  46)  That  is  the  reason  why  Nietzsche  says  at  the  
end  of  the  first  chapter  that  “psychology  is  now  again  the  path  to  the  fundamental  
problems”  and  psychology  in  his  definition  is  precisely  “morphology  and  the  
development  of  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power.”  (BGE,  23)22  
                                                                                                              
22  Van  Tongeren,  Reinterpreting  Modern  Culture:  An  Introduction  to  Nietzsche’s  Philosophy,  pp.  155  
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3. Second Part: Who is the Philosopher of the Future? 
In  the  previous  part  we  have  examined  Nietzsche’s  critical  engagement  with  the  
traditional  philosophy  and  religion.  His  attitude  is  neither  simple  rejection  nor  total  
affirmation.  On  the  one  hand,  he  gives  the  whole  enterprise  of  philosophy  and  religion  
his  highest  respect;  on  the  other  hand,  he  criticizes  the  philosophers  and  religious  people  
in  the  past  for  lacking  self-­‐‑knowledge.  Their  philosophy/religion  is  fundamentally  
dependent  on  some  type  of  passion  or  instinct,  but  they  are  not  aware  of  that  or  pretend  
to  be  “objective”  and  “disinterested.”  This  mistake  is  related  to  a  more  fundamental  
mistake,  namely  the  presupposition  that  opposite  values  must  have  different  origins,  
and  the  supreme  value  must  have  originated  outside  human  beings  or  beyond  this  
world.  Nietzsche  proposes  a  bold  hypothesis  that  the  opposite  values,  both  the  good  and  
the  evil,  flow  from  one  single  source:  the  will  to  power.  Thus  the  opposite  values  are  not  
truly  opposite  in  nature,  but  they  are  different  types  and  manifestations  of  will  to  power  
that  differ  in  degree.  Philosophizing  as  the  most  spiritual  will  to  power  requires  the  
strongest  will,  particularly  philosophizing  in  Nietzsche’s  sense.  For  Nietzsche,  
philosophizing  should  not  be  merely  relying  on  one  dominating  drive  in  the  soul  and  
sublimating  it.  It  should  resist  the  temptation  to  rest  on  any  such  stable  foundation.  It  
requires  the  ruthless  questioning  and  examining  of  every  sort  of  drives  in  the  human  
soul  that  have  emerged  in  history.  It  must  “go  down”  to  explore  the  depth  of  the  soul  in  
order  to  attain  heights  of  the  soul.  This  inquiry  is  fundamentally  motivated  by  the  will  to  
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power  and  thus  is  aimed  at  complete  freedom  and  independence,  in  order  to  command  
and  rule  the  rest  of  human  beings.    
This  is  what  Nietzsche  has  learned  from  and  rejected  in  the  philosophical  and  
metaphysical  tradition.  What  he  sets  out  to  do  in  the  last  five  chapters  of  BGE,  is  to  build  
on  this  foundation  and  carry  on  the  exploration  of  the  soul.  The  soul  for  Nietzsche  is  not  
an  everlasting,  unchanging  generic  entity;  but  consists  of  numerous  competing  drives  
that  constantly  strive  for  domination.  Thus,  the  soul  can  undergo  historical  
transformation  and  development.  This  leads  Nietzsche  to  suggest  we  can  best  
understand  the  soul  in  terms  of  different  types.  By  exploring  the  history  and  
development  of  different  types  of  souls,  Nietzsche  is  clearly  concerned  with  the  highest  
type  or  the  noblest  type,  presumably  the  philosopher  of  the  future.  The  major  theme  of  
the  second  part  can  be  summarized  as  an  attempt  to  outline  in  detail  what  the  
philosopher  of  the  future  should  be  like  and  what  his  task  is.    
Nietzsche  approaches  this  problem  both  negatively  and  positively.  The  whole  
second  part  can  be  viewed  as  a  gradual  ascent  from  the  basest  type  to  the  highest  type.  
The  first  is  the  modern  democratic  type  of  soul  that  is  characterized  by  “morality  of  
timidity.”  The  second  type  is  represented  by  the  scientific  men  or  scholars,  whose  
scientific  spirit  elevates  them  somehow  over  the  general  modern  type,  but  is  still  
fundamentally  based  on  democratic  instincts.  The  third  type  is  the  soul  of  free  spirit  of  
today,  which  is  fundamentally  modern,  but  also  has  virtues  that  are  laudable  and  
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distinctive.  But  still,  the  free  spirit  is  characterized  by  a  fundamental  tension  and  hence  
still  experience  itself  as  a  problem.  This  tension  is  more  clearly  manifested  in  the  tension  
between  man  and  woman.  This  is  further  developed  into  the  fourth  type  of  the  soul,  
which  is  the  soul  of  we  “good  Europeans,”  which  is  still  more  a  possibility  than  a  reality.  
Nietzsche  attempts  to  explore  it  by  examining  the  different  types  of  the  soul  in  different  
countries  of  Europe  today.  In  the  last  chapter  he  finally  gives  his  tentative  answer  to  the  
question  of  the  highest  type,  the  noble  type  of  human  beings.  A  careful  reading  reveals  
that  Nietzsche  distinguishes  three  dimension  of  this  noblest  type,  namely  the  noble  man,  
the  hermit  philosopher  and  the  philosophizing  god.  The  noble  man  is  the  highest  type  
viewed  from  outside,  the  hermit  philosopher  as  viewed  from  within,  and  the  
philosophizing  god  as  the  ideal  philosopher.    
3.1 The Science of Morals and the Herd Type 
In  the  first  part  of  BGE,  Nietzsche’s  chief  concern  is  to  reveal  the  importance  of  
the  doctrine  of  will  to  power  and  to  show  how  that  can  serve  as  a  working  hypothesis  
for  philosophical  inquiries.  One  essential  implication  of  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power  
is  methodology;  Nietzsche  thinks  that  previous  philosophies  try  to  look  for  “a  rational  
foundation  of  morality”  while  taking  morality  for  granted.  They  never  question  “the  
common  faith  in  the  prevalent  morality”  but  just  express  it  in  a  more  systematized  
manner.  (BGE,  186)  Instead  Nietzsche  suggests  “a  typology  of  morals”  that  takes  the  
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very  phenomenon  of  morality  as  a  problem  and  explores  what  factors  have  conditioned  
the  emergence  of  such  and  such  moralities.  (BGE,  186)    
The  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power  also  teaches  the  fundamental  oneness  of  the  
origin  of  both  good  and  evil:  that  means,  the  world  is  fundamentally  characterized  by  
duality  and  tension  of  different  opposites;  these  opposites  cannot  exist  alone  but  in  
pairs.  Nietzsche  has  suggested  this  duality  in  the  fifth  chapter  and  he  regards  the  herd  
morality  as  a  fundamental  attempt  to  eradicate  such  tension  that  is  the  essence  of  human  
existence.  In  trying  to  eradicate  evil  and  suffering,  the  modern  herd  type  of  morality  also  
inadvertently  destroys  the  possibilities  for  goodness  and  greatness.  (BGE,  198)  
Nietzsche  takes  morality  as  a  “a  sign  language  of  the  affects.”  (BGE,  187)  The  
different  moralities  themselves  are  the  surface  and  masks  of  deeper  drives  and  
motivations  that  operate  in  us;  these  are  like  the  dark  bodies  around  the  stars  that  could  
never  be  seen,  hence  we  must  “infer”  their  existence.  (BGE,  196)  This  does  not  mean  that  
the  dark  bodies  are  more  important  or  fundamental  than  the  starts,  but  as  Nietzsche  
suggests,  that  they  actually  exist  together  and  rely  on  each  other.  Despite  their  apparent  
opposition,  they  actually  have  the  same  origin  in  the  life’s  will  to  power.  
Nietzsche  continues  to  explain  the  different  manifestations  of  the  duality  or  
tension.  The  first  and  the  most  important  of  its  kind  is  the  tension  between  morality  and  
“nature.”  (BGE,  188)  It  should  be  noted  that  in  this  aphorism  all  of  the  mentions  of  
“nature”  are  put  in  quotation  marks  except  for  the  last  one,  which  appears  in  the  “moral  
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imperative  of  nature.”  All  the  “nature”  put  in  the  quotation  marks  stress  the  quality  of  
laisser  aller  or  letting  go  of  “nature,”  which  is  the  common  understanding  of  it.  Nietzsche  
emphasizes  the  fact  that  these  moralities  are  arbitrary  and  tyrannical,  and  have  led  to  
both  great  and  disastrous  results,  but  they  are  absolutely  indispensable.  In  the  last  
paragraph,  Nietzsche  does  not  use  quotation  marks  when  talking  about  “the  moral  
imperative  of  nature,”  which  suggests  that  he  is  not  totally  against  the  idea  that  nature  is  
moral  and  commands  morally.  Yet  certainly  nature’s  morality  is  different  from  the  
commonly  understood  human  morality.  These  arbitrary  human  moralities  are  just  “sign  
language”  or  appearances  of  a  still  deeper  and  more  profound  morality  of  nature,  that  is  
the  will  to  power.  “In  all  her  prodigal  and  indifferent  magnificence,”  nature  demands  
the  will  to  power,  which  ultimately  manifests  itself  in  the  restraints  imposed  on  human  
beings  –  moralities.  (BGE,  188)  In  so  far  as  the  will  to  power  is  the  source  of  both  good  
and  evil,  nature  is  beyond  good  and  evil.  
He  then  uses  an  example  to  illustrate  this  complex  relationship  between  nature  
and  morality.  It  seems  that  despite  the  appearance  of  mutually  exclusive  functioning,  
morality  and  nature  actually  enhance  each  other.  Nietzsche  remarks  that  the  occasional  
fasts  instituted  by  ancient  legislators  are  actually  designed  to  “purify  and  sharpen”  the  
drives  and  desires  that  they  seemingly  suppress.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  then  that  
true  laissez  faire  will  not  lead  to  the  thriving  of  the  drives,  but  probably  would  cause  
them  to  drain  themselves.  (BGE,  198)  The  recognition  of  the  mutual  enhancement  of  
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opposite  powers  is  essential  to  understand  Nietzsche’s  science  of  morals,  and  this  is  also  
in  line  with  his  notion  of  the  will  to  power  as  the  source  of  opposite  values.  
  This  tension  is  further  illustrated  in  the  “ancient  theological  problem  of  the  
‘faith’  and  ‘knowledge’  –  or,  more  clearly,  of  instinct  and  reason.”  (BGE,  191)  Nietzsche’s  
attitude  on  this  problem  seems  at  the  first  glance  very  ambiguous.  In  the  first  paragraph,  
in  his  description  of  Socrates’  thinking,  he  seems  to  side  with  “instinct”  or  “faith,”  
because  Socrates,  although  first  sided  with  reason,  finally  realized  that  he  too  is  driven  
by  instincts  and  there  is  “at  bottom”  “irrational  element  in  moral  judgments.”  (BGE,  191)  
But  in  the  second  paragraph,  after  he  claims  that  Plato  has  tried  to  prove  that  reason  and  
instinct  are  actually  aimed  at  the  same  goal,  the  good,  he  says  that  after  Plato,  “in  moral  
matters”  instinct  and  faith  have  triumphed.  (BGE,  191)  Because  Nietzsche  has  a  negative  
opinion  of  Platonism,  he  seems  to  condemn  this  triumph  of  the  instinct.  But  in  the  last  
sentence,  where  he  mentions  Descartes  as  the  father  of  rationalism  and  “the  grandfather  
of  the  Revolution,”  he  seems  to  doubt  that  the  concession  of  authority  to  reason  alone  is  
also  not  a  wise  choice.  How  to  understand  this  ambiguity?  
  This  can  be  better  understood  by  reading  the  next  aphorism,  which  reveals  the  
mutual  dependence  of  knowledge  and  faith.  In  order  to  “know”  anything,  we  must  have  
“the  rash  hypotheses,  the  fictions,  the  good  dumb  will  to  ‘believe’.”  In  other  words,  a  
certain  “faith”  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  get  any  knowledge  at  all.  (BGE,  192)  Yet  these  
“faiths”  are  not  stable  and  should  not  remain  stable,  but  are  constantly  subject  to  further  
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scrutiny  in  light  of  different  strategies  of  observations.  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  the  effort  to  
“know”  that  provides  the  occasion  for  us  to  “create”  our  vision  of  the  world,  namely  our  
faith.  Knowledge  and  faith  thus  are  fundamentally  dependent  on  each  other.  Once  we  
stop  desiring  to  know,  we  also  stop  believing  in  anything.  Indeed,  Nietzsche  thinks  that  
the  problems  we  set  for  ourselves  are  only  “steps  to  self-­‐‑knowledge,  sign-­‐‑posts  to  the  
problem  we  are,”  “to  the  great  stupidity  we  are,  to  our  spiritual  fatum,  to  what  is  
unteachable  very  ‘deep  down.’”  (BGE,  231)  Thus,  the  fundamental  self-­‐‑knowledge  is  also  
the  recognition  of  fundamental  faith  of  a  person  that  determines  who  he  is.  Therefore,  
Nietzsche  does  not  think  that  either  the  precedence  of  reason  over  instinct  or  instinct  
over  reason  is  preferable,  but  one  has  to  recognize  that  these  two,  although  seemingly  
contradictory,  have  the  same  origin  and  cannot  exist  alone.  The  greatest  knowledge  
coexists  with  the  strongest  faith  in  oneself  –  that  is  perhaps  how  Nietzsche  envisions  a  
man  with  an  abundance  of  will  to  power.    
In  light  of  this  understanding  we  can  better  understand  Nietzsche’s  notion  of  
“the  slave  rebellion  in  morals”  and  “morality  as  timidity.”  (BGE,  195,  197)  At  the  bottom  
of  this  inversion  of  values  is  the  separation  of  these  opposite  values  and  the  assertion  
that  they  have  different  origins.  They  have  invented  “heaven”  as  opposed  to  the  
“world”  which  is  the  origin  for  all  the  bad  and  evil  things.  (BGE,  195)  The  hatred  and  the  
fear  for  evil  things  have  led  them  to  teach  moralities  that  are  chiefly  directed  against  
“affects,”  either  by  suppression  or  by  spiritualization  making  them  moderate  and  
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harmless.  (BGE,  198)  These  moralities  make  people  mediocre.  Nietzsche  thinks  this  is  
like  the  suspicion  that  men  from  “temperate  zones”  have  for  the  “tropical  man,”  who  is  
“man  of  prey”  and  is  dangerous.  (BGE,  197)    
It  should  be  noted  that  Nietzsche’s  assessment  of  the  herd  morality  is  not  all  
negative.  As  has  been  analyzed  above,  all  types  of  morality  as  a  kind  of  discipline  and  
channeling  of  nature’s  will  to  power,  have  the  effect  of  enabling  people  to  achieve  things  
in  the  world.  The  training  of  obedience  through  the  herd  morality,  although  based  on  
fear  and  hatred,  has  been  most  instrumental  for  the  survival  of  the  human  communities.  
(BGE,  199,  201)  Nietzsche  acknowledges  that  even  in  Rome,  the  mother  of  morality  is  
still  “fear  of  the  neighbor”  rather  than  “love  of  the  neighbor.”  (BGE,  201)  But  the  
morality  in  Rome,  as  in  other  earlier  societies,  is  not  herd  morality  in  its  most  developed  
form.  This  morality  of  fear  and  hatred  would  evolve  and  come  to  its  full  consequence  
once  the  external  conditions  permit.  It  would  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  
wipe  out  tensions  and  dangers  that  are  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  will  to  power.  
Before,  tensions  and  dangers  are  a  fact  of  the  world  they  live  in,  particularly  between  
communities,  and  they  need  the  powerful  individuals  to  protect  and  command  them  
(thus  tensions  are  preserved  within  the  community  because  of  the  tensions  outside  the  
community);  now  these  tensions  and  dangers  from  outside  the  community  seem  
insignificant  and  dispensable,  they  see  little  point  in  maintaining  those  within  the  
community.  (BGE,  201)  Therefore,  paradoxically,  people  dominated  by  herd  morality  at  
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the  same  time  loathe  obedience  and  commanding.  Their  hope  is  that  “we  want  that  
some  day  there  should  be  nothing  anymore  to  be  afraid  of!”  (BGE,  201)  That  means  that  
they  are  fundamentally  against  hierarchy  and  hence  both  obedience  and  commanding.  
Their  ideal  is  “autonomous  herd”  without  masters  and  “special  right  and  privilege.”  
(BGE,  202)  Precisely  because  they  are  inimical  to  hierarchy  and  ranks,  they  uphold  their  
own  herd  morality  as  the  only  morality  possible  and  have  done  their  utmost  to  impose  
this  morality  on  those  who  are  born  to  command.  (BGE,  199,  201)  It  is  this  hubris  of  the  
herd  morality,  which  is  the  inevitable  development  of  its  internal  logic,  that  Nietzsche  
abhors  the  most  and  seeks  to  prevent  with  the  introduction  of  the  new  philosophers.  
(BGE,  203)  
Thus,  for  Nietzsche,  since  both  good  and  evil  originate  from  the  will  to  power,  if  
strong  will  can  be  good  and  bad,  weak  will  is  definitely  not  good.  Therefore,  the  efforts  
to  suppress  affects,  to  acquire  rest  and  tranquility,  to  make  one  “soft  and  tender”,  are  all  
characteristic  of  the  weak  will.  Herd  morality  is  essentially  the  manifestation  of  this  
weak  will.  It  is  acceptable  so  long  as  it  is  in  a  subjugated  position,  but  if  it  seeks  to  
dominate  the  strong  will,  it  would  ultimately  lead  to  disastrous  consequences  such  as  
anarchism  or  “the  animalization  of  man  into  the  dwarf  animals  of  equal  rights  and  
claims.”  (BGE,  203)  Nietzsche  believes  this  is  what  the  democratic  and  socialist  
movement  is  heading  towards.  
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3.2 The Intermediate Types: the Scholars and the Modern Free 
Spirit 
After  making  the  transition  from  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power  to  the  
discussion  of  different  types  of  souls,  Nietzsche  sets  out  to  discuss  the  central  problem  of  
the  second  part  of  the  book:  who  is  the  philosopher  of  the  future?  Up  until  now  we  have  
only  a  general  idea  of  what  he  should  be  like:  he  is  characterized  by  complete  freedom  
and  independence,  hence  must  possess  the  art  of  commanding;  he  has  a  strong  will  and  
the  most  spiritual  will  to  power.  That  picture  of  the  philosopher  of  the  future  is  not  
detailed  and  subtle  enough.  The  following  two  chapters,  chapter  6  and  7,  are  therefore  
an  attempt  to  give  a  more  specific  idea  of  what  the  philosopher  of  the  future  looks  like  
by  exploring  two  types  of  souls  that  are  superior  to  the  herd  but  are  still  not  quite  the  
philosopher  of  the  future  himself.  These  are  two  intermediate  types,  which  I  call  the  
scholars  or  the  scientific  men  and  the  modern  free  spirit.  
Nietzsche  seems  to  endorse  the  intermediate  types  to  some  extent.  The  title  of  the  
sixth  chapter  is  “We  scholars,”  and  he  mentions  more  than  once  in  the  book  “we  free  
spirit.”1  He  seems  to  approve  many  of  the  qualities  of  these  intermediate  types,  but  he  is  
also  critical  of  their  insufficiencies.  Their  virtue  is  also  simultaneously  their  stupidity  
and  it  requires  great  art  and  delicacy  to  not  fall  into  such  stupidity.  (BGE,  227)  Another  
important  trait  of  the  intermediate  type  is  that  they  are  both  profoundly  modern.  They  
                                                                                                              
1  Leo  Strauss,  “Note  on  the  Plan  of  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil”  in  Studies  in  Platonic  Political  
Philosophy,  pp.  186  
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are  certainly  no  simple  advocates  for  modern  ideas,  but  they  are  the  embodiment  of  the  
most  cunning  and  subtle  modern  spirit  that  the  innocent  and  noble  ancient  types  know  
little  of.    They  are  the  products  of  the  mixture  of  races  that  is  characteristic  of  the  modern  
age  and  must  necessarily  experience  the  tension  and  conflict  of  different  drives  in  the  
spirit.  (BGE,  200)  Because  of  these  tensions  and  conflicts  they  are  prone  to  skepticism,  
nihilism,  critical  thinking,  objectivity,  historicism  and  honesty.  These  qualities  are  all  
highly  instrumental  for  the  philosopher,  but  they  are  not  the  goal  in  themselves.  For  
Nietzsche,  most  of  them  are  still  not  born  to  be  philosophers  and  commanders.    
In  the  chapter  on  scholars  of  today,  Nietzsche  raises  problem  of  the  hierarchy  of  
science  and  philosophy  in  the  first  aphorism  of  the  chapter.  (BGE,  204)  Nietzsche  sees  
the  emancipation  of  the  scholar  from  philosophy  as  in  essence  the  same  event  as  the  
democratic  movement:  “Freedom  from  all  masters!”  (BGE,  204)  But  at  the  same  time  he  
finds  this  state  of  affairs  entirely  understandable  given  the  respective  situation  of  science  
and  philosophy.  Science,  particularly  natural  science,  has  made  tremendous  progresses  
and  thus  is  in  “good  conscience.”  But  philosophy  today  has  lost  any  grip  on  “the  
masterly  task  and  masterfulness  of  philosophy”  which  can  be  seen  in  Heraclitus,  Plato  
and  Empedocles.  (BGE,  204)  What  does  Nietzsche  mean  by  this  claim?  Why  should  
science  be  subordinate  to  philosophy  and  what  is  the  masterly  task  of  philosophy?  
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Nietzsche  goes  on  to  elaborate  on  the  four  types  of  typical  scholars,  or  four  
typical  characteristics  of  the  scholar:  scientific  men  (BGE,  206),  objective  men  (BGE,  207),  
skeptical  men  (BGE,  208),  and  critical  men  (BGE,  210,  211).    
The  scientific  men,  the  objective  men  and  the  skeptic  men  all  suffered  from  one  
essential  shortcoming,  which  is  the  lack  of  judgment,  the  overall  judgment  of  life,  and  
the  inability  to  affirm  life,  because  they  are  too  cautious  and  prudent  to  do  so.  (BGE,  205,  
208)2  Nietzsche  acknowledges  that  this  is  a  predicament  facing  every  man  of  science  and  
philosophy  today,  since  the  tower  of  science  has  become  so  huge  that  one  risks  
becoming  a  “dilettante”  if  not  becoming  a  “specialist.”  (BGE,  205)  Thus  he  “wisely”  or  
“prudently”  shuns  the  “duty”  or  “right”  to  such  an  overall  judgment  of  life.  Thus  for  
Nietzsche,  the  origin  of  the  scientific,  objective  and  skeptical  men  is  the  fundamental  
lack  of  courage,  for  the  true  philosopher  “risks  himself  constantly,  he  plays  the  wicked  
game.”(BGE,  205)3  But  he  clearly  does  not  think  that  everyone  could  be  such  a  
philosopher  if  he  or  she  was  just  a  bit  braver:  philosopher  cannot  “be  taught,”  one  must  
be  born  to  “know  it”  “from  experience,”  which  is  very  rare.  (BGE,  213)  Therefore,  
ultimately  the  scientific  man  does  not  “choose”  to  be  merely  “scientific.”  He  is  
predestined  to  be  so.  
                                                                                                              
2  Also  in  Z,  Nietzsche  points  out  that  the  essential  feature  of  scholar  is  that  “they  sit  cool  in  the  
cool  shade:  in  everything  they  want  to  be  mere  spectators,  and  they  beware  of  sitting  where  the  
sun  burns  on  the  steps.”  In  other  words,  the  scholar  deliberately  maintains  objectiveness  at  the  
expense  of  a  positive  judgment.    
3  In  Ecce  Homo,  Nietzsche  says  “how  much  truth  does  a  spirit  dare,  how  much  truth  does  it  
dare?...Error  (faith  in  the  ideal)  is  not  blindness,  error  is  cowardice.”  (EH,  3)  
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Such  men  are  still  fundamentally  dependent.4  They  are  not  masters,  not  self-­‐‑
sufficient  nor  noble,  (BGE,  206)  because  they  lack  a  sense  of  self,  but  pride  themselves  on  
that.  They  are  just  like  mirrors  that  reflect  everything  around  them,  but  they  do  not  love  
or  hate.  (BGE,  207)  This  is  due  to  a  fundamental  “paralysis  of  the  will.”  (BGE,  208)  Just  
as  has  been  analyzed  above,  the  will  to  power  is  the  origin  of  both  good  and  evil,  and  
the  scientific,  objective  and  skeptical  man’s  reluctance  to  make  judgments  is  
characteristic  of  such  lack  or  paralysis  of  the  will.  Nietzsche  again  traces  this  weakness  
of  the  will  to  physiological  causes,  particularly  the  mixture  of  races  in  Europe  today.  
(BGE,  200,  208)  
Thus,  Nietzsche  once  again  attributes  the  insufficiency  of  the  scientific,  objective  
and  skeptical  men  to  the  weakness  in  the  will  to  power,  which  is  the  essence  of  herd  
morality.  Although  the  scientific,  objective  and  skeptic  men  are  superior  to  the  average  
herd  man,  in  that  they  have  the  strength  of  will  to  refrain  from  herd  moral  judgment,  
they  are  still  lacking  in  any  positive  will  to  power.  Thus  Nietzsche  compares  them  to  the  
old  maid  who  is  incapable  of  giving  birth  to  anything.  (BGE,  206)  
The  last  type  of  men,  the  critics,  seem  to  be  a  bit  different  from  the  scientific,  
objective  and  skeptical  men,  in  that  the  former  have  “the  certainty  of  value  standards,  
the  deliberate  employment  of  a  unity  of  method,  a  shrewd  courage,  the  ability  to  stand  
                                                                                                              
4  Nietzsche  also  points  out  in  GM  that  the  scientific,  positivist  men  of  today,  who  refuses  to  
believe  there  is  any  truth,  actually  still  “have  faith  in  truth.”  They  are  the  “most  spiritualized  
product”  of  the  ascetic  ideal.  (GM,  “Third  Essay,”  24)    
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alone  and  give  an  account  of  themselves.”  (BGE,  210)    It  seems  therefore  that  the  critics  
are  superior  to  the  skeptics  because  they  at  least  can  make  judgments  about  life.  
However,  Nietzsche  seems  to  prefer  the  skeptics  and  scorn  the  critics.  It  is  the  “truth”  of  
the  critics  that  Nietzsche  despises.  Their  truth  seems  to  be  “enthusiastic,  idealistic,  
feminine,  hermaphroditic,”  and  they  are  satisfied  and  pleased  with  such  “truth.”  Thus,  
the  prime  example  of  critics,  Kant,  is  at  best  merely  one  of  the  “philosophical  laborers”  
rather  than  genuine  philosopher.  (BGE,  211)  The  work  of  philosophical  laborers  is  to  
render  the  “former  positings  of  values”  into  systems  and  formulas  which  would  make  
them  easy  to  grasp  and  understand.  But  the  genuine  philosophers  are  “commanders  and  
legislators”  who  must  “create  values”  rather  than  inherit  and  systematize  old  values.  
(BGE,  211)  
Thus,  it  is  logical  to  conclude  that  genuine  philosophers  are  necessarily  
philosophers  of  the  future,  namely  “a  man  of  tomorrow  and  the  day  after  tomorrow,”5  
which  means  that  “his  enemy  was  ever  the  ideal  of  today.”  (BGE,  212)  But  still,  if  we  
take  this  description  literally,  it  would  seem  that  philosophers  do  not  have  their  own  
standards  but  are  reactive  to  the  historical  situation.6  That  is  not  the  case.  Nietzsche  
                                                                                                              
5  Nehamas,  “Who  is  Nietzsche’s  Philosopher  of  the  Future?”  in  Reading  Nietzsche,  pp.  58  
6  For  example,  Vattimo  also  thinks  that  Nietzsche’s  conception  of  “active  nihilism”  as  opposed  to  
“passive  nihilism,”  is  still  reactive  in  its  effort  to  “transcend  one’s  own  interest  in  self-­‐‑
preservation.”  Gianni  Vattimo,  “The  Two  Senses  of  Nihilism  in  Nietzsche,”  Dialogue  with  
Nietzsche,  pp.  140  
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clarifies  immediately  that  the  goal  of  the  philosophers  is  a  kind  of  “greatness  of  soul,”7  
but  different  historical  circumstances  require  different  strategies.  (BGE,  212)  What  
exactly  constitutes  the  “greatness  of  soul”  is  explained  in  greater  detail  in  the  last  two  
chapters.  
The  scholars  are  not  sufficient,  fundamentally  because  they  are  not  born  or  
cultivated  for  the  task  of  philosophy.  (BGE,  213)  Philosophizing  should  combine  “a  bold  
and  exuberant  spirituality  that  runs  presto  and  a  dialectical  severity  and  necessity  that  
takes  no  false  step.”  (BGE,  213)  Yet  for  most  of  the  scholars,  thinking  for  them  is  a  grave  
and  serious  task;  they  have  no  idea  of  a  kind  of  “divine  frivolity”  that  gives  them  the  
freedom  of  spirit.  (BGE,  193)  It  thus  seems  that  it  is  vital  for  philosophers  to  combine  
opposite  tendencies  in  an  artful  and  elegant  manner  without  becoming  grave,  
ponderous  and  contradictory.  This  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  difficulty  the  intermediate  
types  encounter.  They  possess  some  of  the  virtues  of  the  philosophers,  but  they  are  so  
attached  to  their  virtues  that  they  become  slaves  to  these  virtues  rather  than  their  
masters.  This  inability  to  live  joyfully  and  lightly  with  contradictions  and  tensions  is  the  
most  essential  deficiency  of  the  intermediate  type.    
In  the  next  chapter  (chapter  7)  Nietzsche  continues  to  elaborate  on  this  deficiency  
of  the  intermediate  type.  The  modern  free  spirit  has  already  got  rid  of  the  moralistic  
                                                                                                              
7  In  AC  Nietzsche  also  mentions  that  “That  requires  greatness  of  soul:  the  service  of  truth  is  the  
hardest  service.”  (AC,  50)  
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cliché  prevalent  in  the  age  of  our  father:  pity  (BGE,  222),  disinterestedness  (BGE,  220),  
the  soporific  English  morality  (BGE,  228)  –  now  “morality  as  a  pose,  offends  our  taste  
today.”  (BGE,  214,  216)  But  this  very  freedom  has  started  to  become  another  kind  of  
moralistic  pedantry.  In  aphorism  221  Nietzsche  let  a  moralistic  pedant  express  similar  
ideas  about  unegoistic  morality  that  he  himself  clearly  supports,  but  adds  at  the  end  that  
“one  should  not  be  too  right  if  one  wants  to  have  those  who  laugh  on  one’s  own  side;  a  
grain  of  wrong  actually  belongs  to  good  taste.”  (BGE,  221)  Indeed,  the  freedom  of  the  
modern  free  spirit  is  also  marked  by  a  profound  chaos  in  the  soul.  (BGE,  224)  Just  as  
Nietzsche  points  out  in  the  beginning  of  the  chapter,  “we  modern  men  are  determined,  
thanks  to  the  complicated  mechanics  of  our  ‘starry  sky,’  by  different  moralities.”  (BGE,  
215)  This  is  at  the  same  time  our  virtue  and  our  vice.8  
This  profound  chaos  is  perhaps  caused  by,  and  in  turn  manifests  itself  most  
clearly,  in  one  of  the  most  salient  feature  of  the  modern  spirit,  which  is  the  historical  
sense.  Today  because  of  the  free  spirit’s  lack  of  self  and  measure,  we  become  open  to  all  
sorts  of  value  systems  and  life  styles  and  try  them  on  like  costumes.  (BGE,  223)  This  kind  
of  courageous,  patient  and  accommodating  openness  is  ignoble  because  it  is  unable  to  
grasp  “the  perfection  and  ultimate  maturity  of  every  culture  and  art,  that  which  is  really  
noble  in  a  work  or  human  being,  the  moment  when  their  sea  is  smooth  and  they  have  
                                                                                                              
8  Guay  expresses  similar  understanding  in  his  analysis  of  “our  virtues”  that  “internal  complexity  
is  a  shortcoming,  but  at  the  same  time  an  accomplishment.”  Guay,  “Our  virtues,”  pp.  76  
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found  halcyon  self-­‐‑sufficiency,  the  golden  and  cold  aspect  of  all  things  that  have  
consummated  themselves.”  (BGE,  224)  But  for  the  free  spirit,  such  a  state  of  perfection  is  
not  attainable  at  least  for  now;  their  virtues  and  missions  consist  precisely  in  this  kind  of  
tensions.  Now  they  still  need  to  suffer  from  it.  Suffering  is  what  they  should  applaud  and  
embrace  now,  because  they  still  have  the  mission  of  creating  themselves  and  human  
beings.  (BGE,  225)  Thus,  cruelty  and  honesty  of  the  intellectual  conscience,  as  a  force  
against  the  basic  will  of  the  spirit  to  ignorance  and  deception,  is  still  the  most  important  
feature  of  “free,  very  free  spirit.”  (BGE,  227,  229,  230;  GM,  “Second  Essay,”  6)  
But  still,  it  is  clear  that  this  cruel  intellectual  conscience  and  honesty  is  not  the  end  
or  task  in  itself  –  such  virtues  are  instrumental  for  creating  the  new  values,  which  are  
embodied  in  the  philosopher  himself.  The  tensions  and  contradictions  themselves  are  
not  the  goal;  the  goal  is  something  much  more  loftier  and  surer.  Let  us  look  at  two  
relevant  paragraphs:  
“High spirituality itself exists only as the ultimate product of moral qualities; that 
it is a synthesis of all those states which are attributed to “merely moral” men, after they 
have been acquired singly through long discipline and exercise, perhaps through whole 
chains of generations; that high spirituality is the spiritualization of justice and of that 
gracious severity which knows that it is its mission to maintain the order of rank in the 
world, among things themselves – not only among men.” (BGE, 219) 
“To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain and 
overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and 
painted over the eternal basic text of homo natura; to see to it that man henceforth stands 
before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of science, he stands before the rest 
of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of 
old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, “you are more, 
you are higher, you are of a different origin!” – that may be a strange and insane task, 
but it is a task.” (BGE, 230) 
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Both  passages  imply  that  the  task  of  the  philosopher  is  to  maintain  a  certain  kind  
of  order  in  the  world,  but  not  any  kind  of  order,  but  an  order  of  rank  that  is  to  some  
extent  “natural.”9  That  does  not  mean  that  “interpretations”  are  not  necessary,  but  it  
means  that  the  philosopher  should  never  lose  sight  of  the  basic  text  of  nature,  of  the  will  
to  power;  he  must  be  “masters”  of  these  moralities  and  interpretations,  having  examined  
all  of  them  critically  and  objectively  with  historical  sense;  he  must  use  them  to  fulfill  his  
purpose  of  creating  human  beings  that  are  more  natural  and  stronger,  namely  as  like  
himself  as  it  is  possible  to  achieve  (most  of  men  can  not  become  him).  Therefore,  both  
the  scientific  men  and  the  free  spirit  type  are  still  not  philosopher,  because  they  are  
unable  to  affirm  life  and  the  world.  
3.3 The Soul and Music: the Possibilities of “We Good 
Europeans” 
It  might  seem  very  peculiar  and  at  odds  with  my  interpretation  that  Nietzsche  
turns  to  discuss  “peoples  and  fatherlands”  in  Europe  when  he  is  trying  to  delineate  
what  the  philosophy/philosopher  of  the  future  is  like.  I  have  argued  that  the  structure  of  
the  second  part  of  BGE  is  a  gradual  ascent  from  the  basest  type  of  soul  to  the  highest  
type,  which  is  the  philosopher.  If  so,  why  should  Nietzsche  discuss  the  different  types  of  
                                                                                                              
9  In  TI  Nietzsche  also  says  that  “I  too  speak  of  a  ‘return  to  nature,’  although  it  is  really  not  a  going  
back  but  an  ascent  –  up  into  the  high,  free,  even  terrible  nature  and  naturalness  where  great  tasks  
are  something  one  plays  with,  one  may  play  with.”  (TI,  “Skirmishes  of  an  untimely  man,”  48)  
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Europeans  before  he  explains  the  highest  type  of  soul?  What  does  such  discussion  have  
to  do  with  the  philosophy/philosopher  of  the  future?    
Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  at  the  same  time  sensitive  to  historical  and  cultural  
situations  and  faithful  to  eternal  standards.  The  task  of  the  philosopher  is  to  explore  a  
new  concept  of  the  greatness  of  human  beings  (BGE,  212)  in  the  aftermath  of  the  collapse  
of  the  whole  Platonist  enterprise,  which  is  fundamentally  the  same  task  as  “translating  
man  back  into  nature,”  (BGE,  230)  Nietzsche  must  use  the  conditions  and  materials  
available  to  help  him  achieve  his  goals.  Now  he  sees  in  Europe  two  fundamentally  
irresistible  tendencies  that  he  could  take  advantage  of:  the  first  is  the  collapse  of  
Platonism,  which  has  led  to  the  rise  of  free  spirit,  which  also,  however,  runs  the  risk  of  
general  skepticism  and  nihilism  (BGE,  Preface);  the  second  is  the  general  chaos  in  society  
that  has  led  to  the  mixture  of  races,  classes  and  nations  (BGE,  200,  242,  248).  The  
democratization  and  equalization  of  the  Europe  is  both  the  cause  and  effect  of  this  
general  chaos.  Nietzsche  thinks  that  both  have  given  rise  to  a  general  weakening  in  
people’s  will  to  power,  which  in  turn  reinforces  the  chaos  both  in  the  soul  and  in  society;  
but  he  also  regards  this  situation  as  a  rare  opportunity  to  develop  a  new  order  in  the  
soul  and  in  society  that  is  different  from  the  old  order  maintained  by  Platonism.  The  
problem  is,  what  does  such  order  look  like?  What  makes  it  different  from  the  old  order?  
For  Nietzsche,  the  discussion  of  the  political  and  cultural  situation  in  Europe  is  closely  
related  to  the  discussion  of  the  highest  possible  type  of  soul,  for  he  is  also  of  the  opinion  
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that  the  structure  of  the  soul  resembles  the  structure  of  a  political  society  (BGE,  19),  and  
thus  the  chaos  in  Europe  today  is  fundamentally  rooted  in  the  chaos  of  the  soul  of  the  
modern  Europeans.  The  discussion  of  different  types  of  the  souls  of  different  European  
countries  is  thus  an  attempt  to  explore  the  possibility  of  finding  a  new  type  of  
“European  soul”  that  is  neither  chaotic  nor  plain  and  flattened  by  herd  morality.10  
One  sign  of  this  general  chaos  is  precisely  the  nationalistic  feelings  and  
tendencies  prevalent  in  Europe  today,  particularly  in  Germany.  Although  this  is  
arguably  a  manifestation  of  the  will  to  power  and  is  better  than  the  feminine  skepticism  
and  nihilism  (BGE,  209),  Nietzsche  still  scorns  this  because  he  sees  this  as  still  
fundamentally  “petty  politics.”  (BGE,  208)  Nationalism  is  still  a  form  of  narrow,  
parochial  will  to  power,  hence  it  is  “petty.”  It  is  unable  to  help  the  statesman  to  fight  for  
the  great  politics  in  the  next  century  whose  goal  is  “the  dominion  of  the  earth.”  (BGE,  
208)  For  Nietzsche,  strength  is  not  primarily  physical  power,  although  physical  power  is  
very  important;  it  is  the  strength  of  the  will,  which  is  fundamentally  guaranteed  by  the  
greatness  of  the  soul  and  “a  great  thought.”  (BGE,  241)  Physical  power  is  arguably  only  
a  manifestation  of  the  strength  of  the  will.  For  Nietzsche,  the  true  commander  and  
legislator  can  only  be  the  true  philosopher,  who  has  the  most  spiritual  and  strongest  will  
                                                                                                              
10  In  “On  the  thousand  and  one  goal”  in  Z,  Nietzsche  argues  that  every  great  people  in  history  
has  set  for  itself  some  kind  of  goal,  and  hence,  the  lacking  of  a  goal  for  the  humanity  as  a  whole  
implies  the  fact  that  the  humanity  as  a  whole,  as  a  real  entity,  is  yet  to  be  achieved.  (Z,  “On  the  
thousand  and  one  goal”)  Similarly,  here  Nietzsche  thinks  that  a  type  of  “good  European”  is  still  
lacking  despite  the  fact  that  Europe  wants  to  be  one,  and  it  is  an  imperative  task  that  a  goal  for  
Europe  as  a  whole  be  envisioned.  (BGE,  256)  
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to  power,  thus  is  able  to  give  true  “orders.”  The  politicians  that  rely  on  the  popular  
support  and  nationalistic  feelings  are  not  true  commanders;  they  just  bow  to  the  masses  
–  they  are  “servants  of  the  people,”  not  their  masters.  (BGE,  241)  But  still,  since  the  will  
to  power  is  both  the  origin  of  good  and  evil,  these  two  types  of  “tyrant”  –  the  spiritual  or  
philosophical  tyrant  and  the  political  tyrant  –  come  dangerously  close  and  are  most  
likely  to  rise  in  an  age  where  chaos  reign  and  the  herd  craves  for  a  master.  (BGE,  242)  
Nietzsche  is  constantly  alert  to  the  duality  of  the  effect  of  the  will  to  power  (which  is  the  
core  of  his  objection  to  the  traditional  metaphysics)  and  thus  aware  of  the  risk  and  
danger  involved  in  his  enterprise.  Still  he  believes  in  the  possibility  of  finding  a  type  of  
soul  that  could  lead  to  the  improvement  and  advancement  of  the  people  in  Europe  in  
the  next  century,  which  entails  a  type  of  human  being  that  is  stronger  and  more  natural.  
That  is  the  soul  of  the  philosopher  and  his  task:  “a  new  synthesis”  and  “the  European  of  
the  future.”  (BGE,  256)  
Nietzsche’s  vision  of  the  new  order  in  a  future  Europe  and  in  the  soul  of  the  
future  Europeans  is  certainly  not  like  Kant’s  ideal  of  “perpetual  peace.”  It  is  richer,  more  
complex,  profounder  and  more  stimulating  than  the  soporific  and  boring  type  of  order.  
Just  as  Acamora  and  Pearson  point  out,  the  problem  can  be  framed  as  “how  is  it  that  a  
multiplicity  becomes  united,  becomes  potent  rather  than  dysfunctional?”11  It  should  be  
                                                                                                              
11  Christa  Acamora  and  Keith  Ansell-­‐‑Pearson,  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil:  A  Reader’s  Guide,  
pp.  178  
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noted  that  the  first  and  last  aphorism  of  the  eighth  chapter  both  have  substantial  portion  
of  the  passage  devoted  to  the  music  of  Richard  Wagner.  For  Nietzsche,  the  problem  of  
the  order,  both  in  the  soul  and  in  society,  seems  to  be  closely  related  to  the  problem  of  
music.  Music  provides  the  possibility  of  maintaining  order  and  peace  without  losing  
vitality,  richness  and  diversity;  it  is  possible  to  maintain  balance  between  opposing  and  
conflicting  tendencies  characteristic  of  the  will  to  power.  But  for  Nietzsche,  not  all  types  
of  music  are  good  and  there  is  certainly  an  order  of  rank  among  different  types  of  music.  
In  chapter  8  Nietzsche  seems  to  think  there  is  a  correspondence  between  music  and  soul,  
and  the  order  of  rank  of  music  reflects  fundamentally  the  order  of  rank  in  the  soul.  
The  first  aphorism  is  a  description  of  Richard  Wagner’s  overture  to  the  opera  
Meistersinger,  which  is  meant  to  be  at  the  same  time  a  description  of  the  German  spirit  or  
the  German  soul.  Taken  together  with  aphorism  244  and  245,  we  can  have  a  general  
understanding  of  what  Nietzsche  thinks  the  German  spirit  is.  It  is  first  of  all  
characterized  by  its  richness  and  complexity,  thus  seems  to  be  heavy  and  profound.  It  
contains  things  of  opposite  origins  and  contradictory.  The  German  soul  poses  itself  as  
labyrinths  and  riddles.  But  Nietzsche  thinks  that  this  seeming  profundity  is  actually  a  
kind  of  disguise  or  deception  to  conceal  the  real  emptiness,  instability  and  uncertainty  of  
the  Germans  about  themselves:    
“[A] truly genuine token of the German soul which is at the same time young and 
superannuated, overly mellow and still overrich in future. This kind of music expresses 
best what I think of the Germans: they belong to the day before yesterday and the day 
after tomorrow – as yet they have no today.” (BGE, 240) 
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“The German himself is not, he becomes, he ‘develops.’ ‘Development’ is 
therefore the truly German find and hit in the great realm of philosophical formulas – a 
governing concept that, united with German beer and German music, is at work trying to 
Germanize the whole of Europe.” (BGE, 244) 
“The German drags his soul along: whatever he experiences he drags. He digests 
his events badly, he never gets ‘done’ with them; German profundity is often merely a 
hard and sluggish ‘digestion.’” (BGE, 244) 
Thus  the  German  spirit  is  very  much  like  the  intermediate  type  Nietzsche  
describes  in  the  previous  two  chapters:  it  has  acute  senses  and  subtle  feelings,  it  has  
eager  curiosity  and  is  open  to  all  kinds  of  possibilities,  but  fundamentally  it  is  not  sure  
about  itself.  This  uncertainty  and  tensions  make  it  serious,  heavy  and  clumsy.  It  
constantly  seeks  itself  and  hence  does  not  deserve  high  respect.  (BGE,  266)  It  lacks  the  
“divine  frivolity”  and  “noble  taste.”  (BGE,  193,  224)12  
This  shortcoming  is  also  manifest  in  the  German  language,  particularly  its  sound  
and  tempo.  Nietzsche  uses  two  aphorisms  to  complain  about  the  lack  of  appropriate  
tempo  and  the  art  of  reading  in  the  German  language.  (BGE,  246,  247a)  For  Nietzsche,  it  
seems  that  language  itself  is  fundamentally  a  kind  of  music:  “the  crescendos,  inflections,  
and  reversals  of  tone  and  changes  in  tempo  in  which  the  ancient  public  world  took  
delight”  are  more  important  than  the  actual  content  of  the  speech.  (BGE,  247a)  The  
tempo  and  rhythm  of  the  language  makes  it  a  fundamentally  political  art,  rhetoric,  
which  can  “grow  into”  people’s  hearts.  (BGE,  247a)  Music,  language,  soul  and  politics  
                                                                                                              
12  Nietzsche  also  says  in  TI  that  “light  feet  are  the  first  attribute  of  divnity.”  (TI,  “The  Four  Great  
Errors,”  2)  
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become  closely  associated  with  one  another  in  Nietzsche’s  philosophy,  in  that  they  
pertain  to  the  order  or  structure  of  different  drives  in  the  soul.13  His  standard  of  
judgment  may  be  very  subtle  to  describe  specifically,  but  it  is  certain  that  he  prefers  a  
kind  of  powerful  and  elegant  mastering  and  commanding  of  the  order  and  arrangement  
of  all  the  drives  and  elements  in  the  a  speech,  a  piece  of  music  or  the  soul,  for  example,  
the  ancient  politician’s  art  of  speech:  
“A period in the classical sense is above all a physiological unit, insofar as it is 
held together by a single breath. Such periods as are found in Demosthenes and Cicero, 
swelling twice and coming down twice, all within a single breath, are delights for the 
men of antiquity who, from their own training, knew how to esteem their virtue and how 
rare and difficult was the delivery of such a period. We really have no right to the great 
period, we who are modern and in every sense short of breath.” (BGE, 247a) 
This  “short  of  breath”  implies  also  a  “short”  of  the  power  in  the  soul,  the  
inability  to  command  and  digest  all  the  feelings  and  drives  that  comprise  the  soul.14  This  
weakness  is  characteristic  of  German  romanticism  which  Nietzsche  thinks  rules  German  
music  after  Beethoven,  which  was  fundamentally  “a  small  taste,”  “a  German  event”  
instead  of  “the  voice  for  the  soul  of  Europe.”  Thus,  in  all  his  discussion  of  music  and  
language,  he  is  in  fact  considering  the  problem  of  a  new  type  of  soul  for  the  future  
Europeans,  particularly  its  ruling  class.  
                                                                                                              
13  For  example,  Nietzsche  thinks  that  “good  is  any  style  that  communicates  an  inward  state,  that  
makes  no  mistake  about  signs,  the  gestures  –  all  the  laws  about  long  periods  are  concerned  with  
the  art  of  gestures.”  (EH,  “  Why  I  write  such  good  books,”  4)  
14  Douglas  Burnham,  Reading  Nietzsche:  An  Analysis  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  178  
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Nietzsche  clearly  thinks  that  the  German  spirit  is  insufficient  a  type  to  become  
the  soul  of  we  “good  Europeans.”  It  must  be  complemented  by  the  Southern  spirit,  
which  is  embodied  in  the  French  spirit.  “The  artistic  passions,”  “the  psychological  
oversensitivty  and  curiosity,”  “the  synthesis  of  the  north  and  south”  are  the  three  things  
that  make  the  French  spirit  superior.  (BGE,  254)  The  elegance,  cheerfulness  and  delicacy  
of  the  French  spirit  combined  with  the  German  profundity  and  complexity  is  perhaps  
able  to  produce  a  kind  of  soul  that  is  nobly  European.  This  combination  is  like  the  
marriage  of  woman  and  man:  the  German  is  the  masculine  nation  which  “above  all  
begets  and  wants  to  beget,”  the  French  is  the  feminine  nation  who  “prefers  being  
fertilized  and  giving  birth.”  (BGE,  248)  In  the  last  aphorism,  Nietzsche  again  returns  to  
Wagner’s,  this  time  he  thinks  that  Wagner  has  been  able  to  transcend  what  is  merely  
German.15  
There  are  two  other  important  nations  in  Europe  that  are  distinct  from  both  the  
German  and  the  French,  the  Jews  and  the  English.  Nietzsche’s  attitude  towards  these  
two  nations  is  quite  ambiguous.  But  one  thing  is  certain:  Nietzsche  thinks  both  nations  
are  very  powerful  and  possess  the  strength  of  will  that  are  much  stronger  than  both  the  
German  and  the  French.16  The  Jews  and  the  English  are  more  adamant  in  their  moralities  
                                                                                                              
15  See  also,  GM,  “Third  Essay,”  3,  where  Nietzsche  argues  that  Wagner’s  Parsifal  has  transcended  
his  earlier  works.  
16  In  AC,  Nietzsche  also  argues  that  “the  Jewish  people  are  a  people  endowed  with  the  toughest  
vital  energy,  who,  placed  in  impossible  circumstances,  voluntarily  and  out  of  the  most  profound  
prudence  of  self-­‐‑preservation,  take  sides  with  all  the  instincts  of  decadence.”  (AC,  First  Book,  24)  
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and  beliefs,  and  hence  much  better  off.  (BGE,  250,  252)  For  the  Jews,  Nietzsche  thinks  
that  if  they  are  willing,  they  could  easily  rule  the  entire  Europe;  but  they  don’t  want  to  
and  even  try  to  simulate  into  different  nations.  (BGE,  251)  But  only  a  nation  at  least  as  
powerful  and  strong  as  the  Jews  themselves,  namely  the  English,  can  achieve  that.  The  
Germans  are  not  yet  strong  enough  for  that  task.  (BGE,  251)    
Still,  Nietzsche  wouldn’t  prefer  either  Jews  or  the  English  to  be  the  model  for  the  
future  Europeans.  The  Jews  belong  to  the  past,  to  the  great  metaphysical  tradition  that  is  
magnificent  but  is  coming  to  an  end.  (BGE,  250)  The  English  are  representative  of  the  
modern  industrious  and  mediocre  diligence,  which  lacks  “real  power  of  spirituality”  
and  more  importantly,  “music.”17  (BGE,  252)  The  English  represents  the  best  of  “herd  
morality”  and  “modern  ideas,”  but  is  still  not  noble,  not  philosophical  enough.  (BGE,  
253)  
It  turns  out,  after  finishing  the  eighth  chapter,  that  Nietzsche  doesn’t  provide  a  
specific  description  of  how  the  new  type  of  soul  for  the  future  Europeans  should  look,  
but  still  we  have  a  general  idea  of  what  it  should  avoid  and  what  it  should  uphold.  This  
prepares  the  climax  in  the  ninth  chapter  in  which  Nietzsche  tries  to  elaborate  on  the  
highest  and  noblest  type  of  soul,  which  should  serve  as  standards  for  all  the  inferior  
types.  I  think  the  following  passage  best  captures  the  image  of  what  Nietzsche  thinks  to  
                                                                                                              
17  In  TI,  Nietzsche  seems  to  hold  that  it  is  precisely  because  the  English  are  strong  that  they  are  
lack  of  spirituality.  (TI,  “Skirmishes  of  an  untimely  man,”  14)  
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be  the  soul  of  “the  good  European,”  and  points  to  his  final  teaching  on  the  highest  type  
of  the  soul.  
“I could imagine a music whose rarest magic would consist in its no longer 
knowing  anything of good and evil, only now and then some sailor nostalgia, some 
golden shadows and delicate weaknesses would pass over it – an art that from a great 
distance would behold, fleeing toward it, the colors of a setting moral world that had 
almost become unintelligible – and that would be hospitable and profound enough to 
receive such late fugitives. --” (BGE, 255)  
3.4 The Noble Man, the Hermit Philosopher, and the 
Philosophizing God 
The  meaning  of  the  last  chapter  of  BGE  is  perhaps  less  clear  than  any  other  
chapter.  It  consists  of  40  aphorisms,  all  of  which  are  intended  to  address  the  final  
problem  of  the  book,  “what  is  noble,”  the  culmination  of  Nietzsche’s  reflections  on  the  
noblest  type  of  soul  that  forms  the  core  of  the  philosopher  of  the  future.  But  the  structure  
and  connection  of  these  series  of  aphorisms  are  less  clear  than  in  the  preceding  
sections.18  It  almost  seems  as  if  he  has  randomly  collected  a  bunch  of  comments  on  what  
the  highest  type  of  soul.  In  order  to  make  better  sense  of  this  chapter,  I  want  to  argue  
that  this  chapter  describes  the  highest  type  of  soul  from  three  different  perspectives,  that  
of  the  noble  man,  the  hermit  philosopher  and  the  philosophizing  god.  They  are  actually  
the  image  of  the  same  highest  type  of  soul  viewed  from  different  angles.  In  this  way,  we  
                                                                                                              
18  Van  Tongeren  argues  that  in  order  to  answer  the  question  of  “what  is  noble,”  Nietzschee  takes  
two  steps:  “a  history  of  the  origin  and  development  of  nobility;  a  psychological  and  physiological  
characterization  of  it.”  Van  Tongeren,  Reinterpreting  Modern  Culture:  An  Introduction  to  Friedrich  
Nietzsche’s  Philosophy,  pp.  227  
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will  have  a  better  and  more  complete  understanding  of  what  the  highest  type  of  soul  
would  look  like  in  different  circumstances  and  conditions.  
The  first  type  is  the  noble  or  the  aristocratic  man.  This  is  how  the  highest  type  of  
soul  would  look  like  from  outside  in  society  and  history.  So  if  we  understand  the  
difference  between  exoteric  and  esoteric  teachings  as  the  difference  of  viewing  from  
outside  and  viewing  form  inside  (BGE,  30),  this  would  be  Nietzsche’s  exoteric  teaching  
that  is  easier  to  grasp  and  fundamentally  “moral,”  for  it  is  a  teaching  about  (masters’  
and  slaves’)  morality  and  based  on  that,  a  teaching  about  the  structure  of  both  the  
society  and  the  soul.  It  is  also  in  accordance  with  the  doctrine  of  the  will  to  power,  which  
Nietzsche  takes  to  be  his  working  hypothesis,  his  interpretation  of  the  world.  If  the  
essence  of  the  world  and  life  is  understood  to  be  the  will  to  power,  namely  that  life  “will  
strive  to  grow,  spread,  seize,  become  predominant  –  not  from  any  morality  or  
immorality  but  because  it  is  living  and  because  life  simply  is  will  to  power,”  (BGE,  259)  
the  natural  way  of  living,  “to  translate  man  back  into  nature,”  would  be  to  affirm  the  
hierarchical  or  aristocratic  society  that  is  based  fundamentally  on  “an  order  of  rank  and  
differences  in  value  between  man  and  man.”  (BGE,  257)  Thus,  it  is  also  vital  to  
discriminate  in  this  kind  of  society  who  is  higher  on  the  social  ladder  and  who  is  lower.  
Nietzsche  uses  the  morality  of  masters  and  the  morality  of  slaves  to  illustrate  this  
distinction.  The  morality  of  the  masters  would  be  what  the  highest  type  of  human  
beings  looks  like  from  the  outside,  particularly  when  they  are  the  governing  class  in  a  
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society  or  community.  Since  it  is  not  always  necessary  for  the  highest  type  of  human  
beings  to  associate  with  other  people  or  rule  in  society,  another  incarnation  of  the  
highest  type  of  soul  would  be  the  hermit  philosopher,  which  I  would  describe  later  as  
the  noble  soul  viewed  from  within.  
The  masters  of  the  aristocratic  society  are  fundamentally  characterized  by  their  
strength  of  the  soul  instead  of  physical  strength  (BGE,  257).  Their  soul  is  full  of  power  
and  is  the  strongest;  they  experience  the  will  to  power  most  fully  and  have  to  discharge  
the  overflowing  power  in  themselves.  (BGE,  260)  This  is  the  fundamental  reason  for  
their  behavior:  they  are  men  of  the  greatest  will  to  power;  as  the  will  to  power  is  a  token  
of  life,  they  are  most  alive  and  live  the  most.  (BGE,  259)  
This  feeling  of  overflowing  power  is  closely  related  to  another  essential  
characteristic  of  the  noble  soul,  which  is  its  “egoism.”  (BGE,  265)  The  noble  man  believes  
in  his  own  superiority  and  therefore  feels  himself  entitled  to  the  privileges  and  rights  in  
society.  Even  his  duties  he  would  view  as  a  type  of  privilege,  which  he  would  not  like  to  
share  with  others.  (BGE,  272)  More  importantly,  he  believes  he  himself,  his  whole  
existence  and  his  way  of  living,  is  the  end  in  itself,  not  a  means.  (BGE,  258)  This  is  his  
reverence  for  himself,  and  it  is  also  manifested  in  his  reverence  for  his  ancestors  and  
tradition.  (BGE,  260)  Indeed,  Nietzsche  argues  that  the  sign  of  nobility  consists  in  the  
faith  of  the  noble  man  in  himself,  “some  fundamental  certainty  that  a  noble  soul  has  
about  itself,  something  that  cannot  be  sought,  nor  found,  nor  perhaps  lost.”  (BGE,  287)  
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In  another  aphorism  Nietzsche  quotes  Goethe:  “Truly  high  respect  one  can  have  only  for  
those  who  do  not  seek  themselves.”  (BGE,  266)  This  fundamental  certainty  is  apparently  
lacking  in  the  intermediate  types  and  in  the  German  spirit  we  discuss  above.  This  is  how  
the  noble  soul  should  be  and  why  it  is  able  to  rule  others.  This  is  a  type  of  manly  
courage  and  confidence  that  leads  to  noble  actions.  (BGE,  209  293)  The  slave,  on  the  
contrary,  is  characterized  by  “a  pessimistic  suspicion  about  the  whole  condition  of  
man.”  (BGE,  260)  
Another  important  feature  of  the  noble  man  is  his  truthfulness.19  His  
powerfulness  makes  him  undaunted  by  any  sort  of  hardship  or  adversity  so  that  he  does  
not  have  to  deceive  himself  or  hide  anything  from  himself.  He  is  able  to  face  the  things  
as  they  are  and  conquer  or  get  over  them.  (BGE,  260)  Because  he  himself  creates  values  
and  is  the  end  in  itself,  he  does  not  have  to  pretend  or  disguise.20  By  contrast,  the  slave  is  
characterized  by  his  dependence  on  the  opinion  of  the  master:  thus  he  has  every  
incentive  to  pretend  to  be  something  he  is  not  and  to  lie  in  order  to  win  others’  good  
opinions,  which  is  vanity.  (BGE,  261)  Indeed,  Nietzsche  even  thinks  that  the  education  
for  the  plebeian,  people  of  lower  origin,  is  actually  a  kind  of  deception,  so  that  they  
                                                                                                              
19  Burnham  also  recognizes  that  “rather  than  a  property  of  a  thought,  truth  is  to  be  understood  as  
a  state  of  being  or  a  mode  of  life.”  Burnham,  Reading  Nietzsche:  An  Analysis  of  Beyond  Good  and  
Evil,  pp.  65;  See  also,  (GM,  First  Essay,  5)  
20  If  we  recognize  this  fundamental  affinity  between  truthfulness  and  nobility,  then  Kirkland’s  
argument  that  in  BGE  Nietzsche’s  main  intention  is  to  prompt  a  change  of  measure  of  politics  
from  truthfulness  to  nobility  would  seem  to  miss  the  point:  what  Nietzsche  detests  is  not  
“truthfulness”  itself,  but  “truthfulness”  in  the  sense  of  Platonism  and  Christianity.  Paul  
E.Kirkland,  “Nietzsche’s  Honest  Masks:  From  Truth  to  Nobility  ‘Beyond  Good  and  Evil’,”  pp.  582  
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could  forget  their  origin  and  become  nobler  than  they  actually  are.  But  still,  this  does  not  
change  the  fact  that  their  nature  is  lower  and  not  noble;  so  the  best  one  can  do  is  to  
“train”  and  “discipline”  them  so  that  they  can  respect  what  is  noble.  (BGE,  263)  
This  is  what  Nietzsche  thinks  to  be  the  chief  features  of  the  noble  man  when  
viewed  from  outside,  particularly  when  he  is  in  society.  But  Nietzsche  also  points  out  
that  although  the  noble  man  is  characterized  by  an  overflowing  amount  of  power,  he  is  
vulnerable  in  the  sense  that  he  may  be  corrupted  by  what  is  lower  and  baser  than  him.  
(BGE,  258,  268,  276)    
“Which group of sensations is aroused, expresses itself, and issues commands in 
a soul most quickly, is decisive for the whole order of rank of its values and ultimately 
determines its table of goods. The values of a human being betray something of the 
structure of his soul and where it finds its conditions of life, its true need.” (BGE, 268) 
Thus,  for  the  more  rare  and  nobler  type  of  soul,  it  is  difficult  to  find  the  
conditions  and  needs  for  such  a  type  among  the  average  or  common  people,  who  would  
always  share  similar  conditions  and  needs.  (BGE,  282)  Therefore,  “the  ruination  of  the  
higher  men,  of  the  souls  of  a  stranger  type,  is  the  rule.”  (BGE,  269)  In  such  dangerous  
conditions,  many  of  the  noble  men  with  the  highest  type  of  soul  choose  not  to  live  
among  other  people,  because  “all  community  makes  men  –  somehow,  somewhere,  
sometime  ‘common.’”  (BGE,  284)21  If  the  noble  man  chooses  to  be  alone  or  remain  in  
                                                                                                              
21  In  Z,  Nietzsche  also  speaks  of  the  danger  that  a  man  like  Zarathustra  would  meet  with  in  the  
crowds  of  men,  and  he  thus  appeals  to  them:  “Flee,  my  friend,  into  your  solitude!  I  see  you  dazed  
by  the  noise  of  the  great  men  and  stung  all  over  by  the  stings  of  the  little  men.”  (Z,  “On  the  flies  
of  the  market  place”)  
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solitude,  he  would  exist  as  the  hermit  philosopher.  Under  such  condition,  the  
complexity  and  profundity  in  the  highest  type  of  soul  are  more  clearly  manifested  than  
if  he  is  among  other  people.  So  here  we  can  have  an  internal  perspective  on  the  highest  
type  of  soul,  since  Nietzsche  tries  to  penetrate  into  the  depth  of  it.  
The  first  thing  that  characterizes  the  noble  soul,  when  viewed  from  within,  is  
surprisingly  the  suffering  that  it  endures.  (BGE,  270,  271,  290)  Nietzsche  does  not  discuss  
in  detail  where  exactly  the  sufferings  of  the  noble  soul  come  from,  but  we  may  speculate  
based  on  the  text.  The  first  possibility  is  that  the  essence  of  the  will  to  power  involves  
profound  suffering,  even  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  increase  of  sense  of  power.  Just  as  has  
been  pointed  out  in  the  above  analysis,  the  will  to  power  always  involves  conflicts,  
tensions  and  contradictory  forces,  and  the  process  of  suppression,  exploitation  and  
transformation  is  inevitably  very  painful.  Nietzsche  also  argues  that  the  initial  
development  of  noble  virtues  is  invariably  under  “unfavorable  conditions”  that  one  has  
to  be  always  prepared  for  arduous  fight  and  constant  danger.  (BGE,  262)  Therefore,  even  
if  there  is  no  such  outer  adversity,  the  soul  of  the  noble  people,  as  the  embodiment  of  the  
will  to  power,  contains  from  the  outset  tensions  that  would  give  rise  to  tremendous  
suffering.  Another  possible  source  of  suffering  may  be  the  baseness  and  senselessness  of  
the  human  world.  For  example,  the  psychologist  would  feel  pain  when  he  observes  the  
ruination  of  higher  men,  which  is  fairly  common  in  the  human  world.  (BGE,  269)  The  
saint  would  experience  what  is  “human,  all  too  human”  as  a  kind  of  dirt,  which  his  
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sense  of  cleanliness  would  abhor  and  promote  him  to  turn  away.  (BGE,  271)  Also,  there  
is  the  problem  of  waiting:  the  waiting  for  the  right  time  of  action  almost  always  comes  
too  late  for  the  higher  men  and  he  thus  must  give  up  in  vain.  (BGE,  274,  277)  The  
happiness  of  human  beings  also  seems  not  profound  enough  for  them.  (BGE,  279)  The  
third  possibility  is  that  he  suffers  from  himself,  the  uncertainty  and  self-­‐‑doubt  he  has  for  
himself.  Since  Nietzsche  thinks  that  there  is  no  predetermined,  fixed  nature  of  human  
beings,  that  any  order  in  the  soul  must  come  from  the  creative  act  of  the  will  to  power,  it  
is  possible  to  assume  that  the  highest  type  of  soul,  who  is  the  most  truthful  being,  has  to  
constantly  face  directly  this  internal  chaos  or  abyss  both  in  the  soul  and  in  the  world,  
which  is  the  terrible  truth  of  nature.  Unlike  the  average,  well-­‐‑order  people  who  can  
dwell  safely  and  happily  under  the  illusion  created  by  philosophy  or  religion,  the  
highest  type  of  person  is  precisely  distinguished  by  his  ability  to  live  and  thrive  without  
such  illusion  or  more  precisely,  with  the  awareness  that  he  is  under  illusion.  That  
knowledge  of  the  impossibility  of  self-­‐‑knowledge  would  thus  occasionally  give  rise  to  
profound  self-­‐‑doubt.  (BGE,  281)  
Thus,  viewed  from  inside,  the  highest  type  of  soul  actually  bears  much  
resemblance  to  the  intermediate  type  of  soul.  Its  scientific  spirit,  its  objectivity,  its  critical  
thinking  and  its  profound  self-­‐‑doubt  are  all  features  of  the  scientific  man.  But  the  
difference  between  them  is  also  most  profound.  The  intermediate  type  is  content  with  
his  state  of  the  soul;  his  limited  strength  of  will  to  power  does  not  strive  to  rise  higher.  
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He  devotes  his  power  to  the  perfection  of  a  specialty  or  a  specific  value  system,  instead  
of  exploring  a  vision  of  the  whole:  the  soul  and  the  world.  In  other  words,  he  remains  
passively  with  the  chaos  of  his  soul,  or  he  stays  with  a  static  vision  in  the  soul.  In  either  
way,  he  is  still  slave  to  powers  alien  to  himself,  to  his  own  virtues.    
On  the  other  hand,  the  highest  type  of  soul  would  become  a  hermit  philosopher.  
To  be  hermit  does  not  mean  to  live  absolutely  alone,  severing  all  contacts  with  other  
human  beings,  for  the  hermit  philosopher  still  has  to  observe  and  study  the  average  
human  beings.  (BGE,  218)  To  be  a  hermit  means  to  always  conceal  something  of  oneself  
that  is  most  profound,  subtle,  and  unspeakable.  This  concealment  or  disguise  requires  
the  constant  production  of  different  masks.  These  masks  would  serve  different  
purposes.  First,  it  would  protect  others  who  are  inferior  to  him  from  the  profound  
sufferings  he  experiences.  (BGE,  270,  290)  It  is  out  of  a  kind  of  “pity”  for  the  average  
man.  (BGE,  290)  Moreover,  this  mask  would  serve  as  a  veil  that  covers  the  chaos  and  
abyss  of  the  truth  and  provide  a  “perspective”  so  that  people  without  strong  will  to  
power  can  live  in  peace  and  order:  
“Man, a manifold, mendacious, artificial, and opaque animal, uncanny to the 
other animals less because of his strength than because of his cunning and shrewdness, 
has invented the good conscience to enjoy his soul for once as simple; and the whole of 
morality is a long undismayed forgery which alone makes it at all possible to enjoy the 
sight of the soul. From this point of view much more may belong in the concept of “art” 
than is generally believed.” (BGE, 291)  
This  is  also  why  the  highest  type  of  soul  viewed  from  outside  would  be  the  noble  
man  who  is  most  certain  and  confident  in  himself,  for  he  uses  different  masks  to  appear  
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in  different  images  that  are  suitable  for  different  purposes.  The  others  would  have  to  
derive  their  own  values  and  standards  from  these  images  and  masks,  and  for  them,  
these  are  not  masks  but  “truth”  because  they  do  not  have  a  rich,  vibrant  and  profound  
spirit  that  they  have  to  hide.  (BGE,  288)  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  philosopher  creates  
values  and  is  himself  beyond  good  and  evil.    
The  masks  are  not  merely  for  other  people  to  look  at.  They  are  also  the  game  and  
the  life  style  of  the  philosopher.  The  masks  simultaneously  reveal  and  conceal  
something  about  their  spirit  that  may  tempt  or  lure  other  similarly  noble  spirit  to  come  
join  in  his  journey.  Every  fabrication  of  a  mask  is  both  a  going  away  and  coming  to  
oneself.  In  this  way  he  penetrates  into  the  deepest  abyss  of  the  world  as  will  to  power  
and  prepares  ever  more  richer,  subtler  and  grand  masks.  (BGE,  278)22  In  going  under  
(Untergehen)  his  soul  also  rises  to  the  highest  heights  where  he  can  look  through  every  
mask  by  looking  down.23  He  obtains  the  free  vision.  (BGE,  286)  
“One of the subtlest means for keeping up the deception at least as long as 
possible and of successfully appearing more stupid than one is – which in ordinary life is 
often as desirable as an umbrella – is called enthusiasm, if we include what belongs with 
it; for example, virtue. For Galiani, who should know, says: vertu est enthousiasme.” 
(BGE, 288) 
                                                                                                              
22  Burnham  also  argues  that  masks  are  also  “tools  of  investigation,  ways  of  identifying  issues,  of  
working  through  or  solving  sub-­‐‑problems,  discourses  that  must  be  understood  in  order  to  be  
inhabited  ironically.”  Douglas  Burnham,  Reading  Nietzsche:  An  Analysis  of  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  
pp.  207  
23  Similarly  in  Z,  Nietzsche  talks  about  how  elevation  of  the  soul  is  related  to  “looking  down:”  
“You  look  up  when  you  feel  the  need  for  elevation.  And  I  look  down  because  I  am  elevated.  Who  
among  you  can  laugh  and  be  elevated  at  the  same  time?  Whoever  climbs  the  highest  mountains  
laughs  at  all  tragic  plays  and  tragic  seriousness.”  (Z,  “On  reading  and  writing”)  
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“In the writings of a hermit one always also hears something of the echo of the 
desolate regions, something of the widespread tones and the furtive look of solitude; in 
his strongest words, even in his cry, there still vibrates a new and dangerous kind of 
silence – of burying something in silence.” (BGE, 289) 
Thus,  the  hermit  philosopher  lives  in  this  ultimate  tension  and  harmony  between  
silence  and  speech.  His  soul  attains  such  greatness  and  depth  that  he  almost  feels  
himself  to  be  one  with  the  entire  universe  or  nature,  like  “the  desolate  regions.”  In  his  
will  to  power  he  utters  words,  thus  creating  masks  or  caves  in  which  man  can  dwell;  but  
the  resounding  echo  of  these  words  constantly  reminds  him  of  the  invisible  yet  ever  
present  abyss  or  realm  that  is  eternal,  or,  “true.”  The  hermit  philosopher  thus  lives  in  
this  constant  conflict  or  struggle  between  truth  (silence)  and  life  (speech),  which  is  the  
ultimate  manifestation  of  his  will  to  power,  and  the  highest,  most  spiritual  will  to  
power.  
“Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy – that is a hermit’s judgment… 
Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout, every word 
also a mask.” (BGE, 289)  
“A philosopher – is a human being who constantly experiences, sees, hears, 
suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as 
from outside, as from above and below, as by his type of experiences and lightning bolts; 
who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings; a fatal human being 
around whom there are constant rumblings and growlings, crevices, and uncanny doings. 
A philosopher – alas, a being that often runs away from itself, often is afraid of itself – 
but too inquisitive not to ‘come to’ again – always back to himself.” (BGE, 292) 
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Therefore  for  Nietzsche,  words  are  only  a  small  part  of  a  philosophy.24  What  is  
kept  unsaid  constitutes  the  greater  part.25  Both  the  silence  and  the  speech  are  meant  to  
conceal  and  reveal  the  nature  of  the  philosopher,  who  is  the  best  proximity  we  could  
have  to  nature,  to  the  truth.26  It  is  in  him  that  nature’s  soul  and  spirit  is  embodied,  in  its  
prodigious  and  vivid  will  to  power.  (“lightning  bolts,”  “rumblings  and  growlings”  etc.)  
The  average  type  of  the  soul  pays  attention  only  to  the  words,  namely  the  surface  and  
mask,  losing  the  opportunity  to  approach  truth  and  hence  living  only  under  illusion.  
Those  of  higher  nature  are  more  apt  to  be  tempted  to  explore  and  imitate  the  life  of  the  
philosopher.  Profound  suffering  is  the  price,  but  freedom  and  richness  of  the  spirit  as  
well  as  the  art  of  commanding  and  legislating  are  the  reward.  Just  as  Nietzsche  points  
out  in  GM,  the  “objectivity  of  intellect”  in  the  future  is  not  “contemplation  without  
interest,”  but  “as  the  ability  to  control  one’s  Pro  and  Con  and  to  dispose  of  them,  so  that  
one  knows  how  to  employ  a  variety  of  perspectives  and  affective  interpretations  in  the  
                                                                                                              
24  Tracy  Strong  also  argues  that  Nietzsche  is  unwilling  to  “separate  a  man  from  what  he  does.”  
Tracy  Strong,  Nietzsche  and  the  Politics  of  Transfiguration,  pp.  117  
25  Perhaps  this  is  also  the  reason  why  Nietzsche  uses  the  aphoristic  style  of  writing,  which  “forces  
the  reader  to  fill  in  what  is  left  unsaid  and  thereby  to  think  along  with  the  philosophical  writer.”  
Paul  Franco,  Nietzsche’s  Englitenment:  The  Free-­‐‑Spirit  Trilogy  of  the  Middle  Period,  pp.  14  
26  Stanley  Rosen  argues  that  Nietzsche  puts  great  emphasis  on  rhetoric  due  to  the  awareness  of  
“the  impossibility  of  ontology,”  which  replaces  philosophy  with  poetry  and  ultimately  ensures  
the  triumph  of  nihilism.  I  think  the  distinction  he  makes  between  Plato  and  Nietzsche,  namely  
that  the  former  retains  the  tension  of  poetry  and  philosophy  and  the  latter  eliminates  it  in  favor  of  
poetry,  is  exaggerated.  This  conclusion  does  not  take  into  account  the  possibility  I’m  considering  
here,  namely  truth  is  understood  concretely  as  the  philosopher  himself  and  philosophy  is  the  
philosopher’s  creative  will  to  power  in  accordance  with  truth  and  nature.  See,  Stanley  Rosen,  
“Remarks  on  Nietzsche’s  ‘Platonism’,”  The  Quarrel  Between  Philosophy  and  Poetry,  pp,  187,  190  
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service  of  knowledge.”  (GM,  “Third  Essay,”  12)Moreover,  the  life  of  the  philosopher  
would  resemble  “nature”  or  “truth”  in  that  it  would  always  be  a  constant  becoming:  
Nietzsche  denies  that  there  would  be  a  final  teaching  for  a  true  philosopher.  Philosophy  
involves  constantly  digging  questioning,  destroying  and  recreating.  But  all  these  works  
are  not  in  vain;  they  are  presupposed  by  the  most  noble  and  natural  way  of  living.27    
The  role  or  activity  of  the  hermit  philosopher  I  have  just  described  resembles  
very  much  that  of  the  genius  of  heart  that  Nietzsche  elaborates  most  beautifully  at  the  
beginning  of  the  penultimate  aphorism.  First,  the  genius  of  heart  is  “the  tempter  god  
and  born  pied  piper  of  consciences.”  (BGE,  295)  His  words  and  behavior  are  all  
enticement  so  that  others  would  be  lured  to  be  his  followers.  Second,  he  uses  masks  to  
help  him  achieve  his  purpose;  he  has  “the  knowledge  of  how  to  seem.”  (BGE,  295)  Third,  
he  makes  those  who  follow  him  and  come  closer  to  him  more  richer,  “richer  in  himself,  
newer  to  himself  than  before,  broken  open,  blown  at  and  sounded  out  by  a  thawing  
wind,  perhaps  more  unsure,  tenderer,  more  fragile,  more  broken,  but  full  of  hopes  that  
as  yet  have  no  name,  full  of  new  will  and  currents,  full  of  new  dissatisfaction  and  
undertows.”  (BGE,  295)  In  other  words,  he  enriches  and  liberates  the  spirit  he  touches  so  
that  it  can  rise  and  rise  to  the  highest  possible  heights.    
                                                                                                              
27  Dalton  points  out  that  “the  development  nature  of  all  being,  as  well  as  the  projective  nature  of  
human  understanding,  determine  that  the  future  must  remain  indeterminate.”  Stuart  Dalton,  
“Beginnings  and  Endings  in  Nietzsche’s  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,”  pp.  62  
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This  genius  of  heart  is  the  god  Dionysus.  He  is  also  a  philosopher.  (BGE,  295)  
Like  the  Greeks,  Nietzsche  makes  gods  as  an  ideal  version  of  human  being,  who  stands  
higher  and  is  more  powerful,  which  is  unlike  Christianity  that  makes  God  the  antithesis  
of  human  beings  and  hence  “perfect”  in  a  human,  all  too  human  sense.  Man  stands  in  
“enormous  abundance  of  gratitude”  instead  of  self-­‐‑denying  sense  of  guilty  in  front  of  
such  a  god.  (BGE,  49)  
Thus  the  difference  between  Dionysus  the  genius  of  heart  and  the  hermit  
philosopher,  is  not  in  nature  but  in  degree.  Dionysus  uses  masks  much  less.28  He  is  less  
concerned  with  the  protection  of  the  inferior  type  of  human  beings  who  are  not  able  to  
stand  the  more  advanced  and  more  terrible  spirit,  while  the  hermit  philosopher  
sometimes  still  suffers  from  pity  for  the  human  beings,  unwilling  to  witness  that  they  
suffer  the  same  as  he  has.  (BGE,  290)  Dionysus  wants  to  make  man  “stronger,  more  evil,  
and  more  profound;  also  more  beautiful.”  (BGE,  295)  Hence  he  uses  masks  only  when  he  
wants  to  entice  and  lure.  He  does  not  use  masks  out  of  a  sense  of  shame  –  he  does  not  
use  humanly  virtues  to  cover  his  evil  and  cunning,  for  he  does  not  care  to  be  discovered  
to  be  beyond  good  and  evil.  (“But  such  a  god  has  no  use  whatever  for  all  such  venerable  
junk  and  pomp.  ‘Keep  that,’  he  would  say,  ‘for  yourself  and  your  likes  and  whoever  else  
                                                                                                              
28  Gillespie  argues  that  for  Nietzsche,  the  wisest  man  “does  not  seek  the  truth;  he  always  seeks  
only  Ariadne.  Love  of  the  mysterious  surface  rather  than  knowledge  of  abysmal  depths  leads  
wisdom  to  new  heights,  leads  man  to  overcome  himself  but  thus  like  Theseus  to  perish.”  
Gillespie,  Nihilism  Before  Nietzsche,  pp.  231,  But  I  think  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  will  to  the  terrible  
truth  that  is  against  and  overcomes  the  basic  will  of  the  spirit  to  deception  and  simplification.  
(BGE,  230)  
  86  
has  need  of  it!  I  –  have  no  reason  for  covering  my  nakedness.’”  BGE,  295)  Just  as  Tracy  
Strong  describes  him,  “Dionysus  calls  not  for  argumentation,  as  might  a  dialectician,  not  
for  inner  light,  as  does  an  evangelist,  but  for  creation,  the  building  of  a  world  in  which  
the  aphorism  will  not  present  itself  as  a  problem.”29    
Thus,  on  the  order  of  rank  of  philosophers,  Dionysus  the  genius  of  heart  would  
certainly  stands  the  highest  for  he  is  the  most  cheerful  and  best  sufferer/bearer  of  the  
truth.30  His  golden  laughter  marks  the  highest  possible  affirmation  of  the  world  and  
oneself,  and  the  greatest  exuberance  of  will  to  power.  (BGE,  294)    
                                                                                                              
29  Tracy  Strong,  Nietzsche  and  the  Politics  of  Transfiguration,  pp.  134  
30  This  cheerfulness,  Nietzsche  says,  “is  a  reward:  the  reward  of  a  long,  brave,  industrious,  and  
subterranean  seriousness.”  (GM,  Preface,  7)  
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4. Conclusion: Friendship and the Marriage of Dark and 
Light 
BGE  ends  in  the  aftersong  entitled  “From  high  mountains.”  It  is  in  the  first  place  
a  song  calling  for  friends.  This  should  come  as  no  surprise  for  us  since  we  have  argued  
that  the  hermit  philosopher  and  the  philosophizing  god  like  to  tempt  and  lure  those  
who  have  the  potentiality  to  become  philosopher  to  join  their  dangerous,  arduous  yet  
most  exciting  journey  to  high  spirituality.  This  is  depicted  as  a  party  on  the  peak  of  a  
mountain:  “Higher  than  mine  no  table  has  been  set:/Who  lives  so  near/The  stars  or  
dread  abysses  half  as  sheer?/My  realm,  like  none,  is  almost  infinite,/And  my  sweet  
honey  –  who  has  tasted  it?”  (BGE,  Aftersong)  Then  the  speaker  starts  to  realize  that  he  
himself  has  changed  so  much  that  none  of  his  old  friends  can  recognize  him.  This  
implies  that  the  journey  of  philosophy  is  in  the  last  analysis  the  cultivation  and  
transformation  (or  transfiguration)  of  one’s  soul  and  body.  Philosophy  is  not  essentially  
a  system  of  dogmas  or  logical  conclusions,  but  a  way  of  living,  a  state  of  existence  as  a  
man  living  in  nature.1  Indeed,  true  philosopher  is  the  one  who  is  able  to  live  in  the  least  
protection  of  lies  and  bogus  solaces  that  are  necessary  for  ordinary,  weaker  people:  “I  
sought  where  cutting  winds  are  at  their  worst?/  I  learned  to  dwell/Where  no  one  lives,  in  
bleakest  polar  hell,/Unlearned  mankind  and  god,  prayer  and  curse?/Became  a  ghost  that  
                                                                                                              
1  In  AC,  Nietzsche  also  argues  that  what  Christ  wants  to  introduce,  the  true  significance  of  the  
“glad  tidings,”  is  not  “a  new  faith”  but  “a  new  way  of  life.”  But  that  message  was  most  
unfortunately  distorted  and  inversed  by  the  apostles  of  Christ.  (AC,  First  Book,  33)  
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wanders  over  glaciers?”  (BGE,  Aftersong)  The  old  friends  of  the  speaker,  “my  ancient  
friends,”  might  be  the  philosophers  before  Nietzsche,  who  with  their  “love  and  fear”  are  
not  able  to  endure  these  “fields  of  ice  and  rock:”  “Here  one  must  be  a  hunter,  chamois-­‐‑
like.”  (BGE,  Aftersong)  The  philosophers  of  the  past,  bound  by  their  human,  all  too  
human  instincts,  are  not  able  to  rise  to  the  heights  that  the  speaker  has  now  attained,  the  
heights  of  beyond  good  and  evil.  
The  following  four  stanzas  continue  to  tell  the  story  of  friendship  between  the  
philosophers  of  the  past  and  the  philosopher  of  the  future  (the  speaker).  “Once  you  were  
young  –  now  you  are  even  younger.”  “Youth’s  longing  misconceived  
inconstancy./Those  whom  I  deemed/Changed  to  my  kin,  the  friends  of  whom  I  
dreamed,/Have  aged  and  lost  our  old  affinity:/One  has  to  change  to  stay  akin  to  me.”  
The  philosophers  of  the  past,  as  Nietzsche  points  out,  are  characterized  by  their  moral  
naivety.  Now  that  Platonism  has  been  gradually  overcome  with  the  advent  of  modern  
philosophy,  one  gets  rid  of  this  naivety  and  becomes  mature.  But  Nietzsche  does  not  
think  that  modern  philosophy  should  be  the  end  of  philosophy  or  the  conclusion  of  
philosophy’s  task:  “Youth’s  longing  misconceived  inconstancy.”  The  vehement  attack  by  
modern  philosophy  on  the  traditional  philosophy  is  still  a  kind  of  youthful  spiritedness.  
(BGE,  31)  The  modern  philosophy  has  yet  to  appreciate  the  true  merits  and  greatness  of  
the  ancient  philosophy,  for  example,  their  naivety.  Indeed,  Nietzsche  argues  that  when  
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one  grows  old,  the  toys  of  his  childhood  no  longer  appeal  to  him;  but  still  the  old  man  
needs  new  toys,  and  he  is  indeed  an  eternal  child.  (BGE,  57)    
Therefore,  at  the  end  of  the  aftersong,  the  speaker  starts  to  applaud  “noon  of  life”  
and  “our  second  youthful  state.”  (BGE,  Aftersong)  Now  that  philosophy  has  attained  
self-­‐‑knowledge,  it  embarks  on  a  new  journey  of  life.  It  has  returned  to  its  starting  point  
where  nothing  is  fixed  or  certain  but  still  full  of  possibilities.  “At  noon  it  was  that  one  
turned  into  two.”  The  noon  is  an  amazing  middle  point  that  divides  the  day  into  two,  
yet  still  maintains  the  unity  of  the  two  parts.2  This  reminds  one  of  Nietzsche’s  doctrine  
of  will  to  power,  which  is  intended  to  replace  the  traditional  metaphysical  assumption  of  
the  separate  origins  of  opposite  values.  Indeed,  the  speaker  finally  announces:  “Friend  
Zarathustra  came,  the  guest  of  guests!/The  world  now  laughs,  rent  are  the  drapes  of  
fright,/The  wedding  is  at  hand  of  dark  and  light.”  (BGE,  Aftersong)  The  separation  and  
hatred  of  good  and  evil,  the  error  of  Platonism,  has  been  cured  in  the  philosopher  of  
Zarathustra,  with  a  laugh.  Only  he  can  live  with  this  great  conflict  and  tension  with  the  
utmost  elegance  and  joy.3  But  the  journey  of  philosophy/philosopher  of  the  future  goes  
on  and  on,  youth  grows  old  and  becomes  young  again,  masks  are  fabricated,  broken  and  
come  together  again,  as  the  eternal  return  of  the  same.  
                                                                                                              
2  It  also  reminds  us  of  Zarathustra’s  ode  to  the  Great  Noon:  “Dead  are  all  gods:  now  we  want  the  
overman  to  live.’  –  Let  this  be  our  last  will  at  the  great  noon!”  (Z,  “On  the  great  longing”)  
3  Haar  describes  this  as  the  “tragic  joy,”  which  means  “the  inseparability  of  the  above  and  the  
below,  of  truth  and  falsehood,  of  good  and  evil.”  Michel  Haar,  Nietzsche  and  Metaphysics,  pp.  152  
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This  paper  is  intended  to  illuminate  Nietzsche’s  conception  of  philosophy  by  
demonstrating  Nietzsche’s  philosophical  journey  in  BGE.  I  hope  I  have  shown  that  
Nietzsche’s  concern  with  the  truth  is  greater  and  more  complicated  than  the  post-­‐‑
modernist  school  has  traditionally  argued,  in  that  he  is  trying  to  envision  a  highest  and  
noblest  type  of  soul  and  living  style  as  the  “truth.”  It  is  not  enough,  therefore,  for  a  
genuine  philosopher  only  to  “produce  a  coherent  and  livable  picture  of  life”  for  oneself.4  
Also  the  traditionalist  school  overlooks  Nietzsche’s  overcoming  of  the  modern  
philosophy  in  his  return  to  the  “childishness”  of  previous  philosophers  after  rejecting  
their  dogmatism.  In  the  last  analysis,  Nietzsche’s  philosopher,  as  the  creator  of  values  
and  indeed  the  entire  order  of  any  life  world,  is  indeed  the  king  or  the  legislator  or  the  
commander  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  term.  In  the  light  of  this  understanding,  we  may  
finally  answer  the  accusation  that  the  mature  Nietzsche  is  radically  anti-­‐‑political5:  for  
Nietzsche,  the  problem  of  culture  and  the  problem  of  politics  are  both  only  different  
dimensions  of  the  problem  of  morality  and  philosophy,  the  problem  of  the  order  in  the  
soul  and  in  society.  The  philosophy/philosopher  of  the  future  indeed  acquires  new  life  
or  “bapatized”  in  the  highest  sense.  (BGE,  212)    
                                                                                                              
4  Nehamas,  “Who  is  the  Philosopher  of  the  Future?”  in  Reading  Nietzsche,  pp.  63  
5  See,  for  example,  Paul  Franco,  Nietzsche’s  Enlightenment:  The  Free-­‐‑Spirit  Trilogy  of  the  Middle  
Period,  pp.  227  
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